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This is an explorative study of the European Union’s (EUs) Fisheries Partnership Agreements 
(FPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The agreements are criticized 
for not being able to implement in practice what they promise on paper. The overall objective 
of FPAs is threefold: securing access for the EU fleet, supplying the Union’s internal market 
and promoting sustainable development of the fisheres sector in the partner country. There is 
an internal conflict between these objectives and the latter remains the most challenging to 
implement. By conducting a governability assessment of the FPA between the EU and the 
Republic of Mozambique this study explores the governance process of such agreements, 
while seeking to identify what components are limiting the governing system’s ability to 
achieve the given objective. The assessment reveals that participation, availability of data, 
institutional organization and efficiency, political power and commitment are key elements. 
Governance interactions that can increase the ability to achieve the given objective are also 
suggested.  
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“When governing systems fail to achieve desired outcomes, the governors are often blamed. 
But the governors are often expected to handle governance challenges beyond their 
capacities, and the unfulfilled objectives are rather a result of a mismatch between the 
needs of the system-to-be-governed and the capacities of the governing system.” 






“Commitment matters, in practical terms, because it b nds together organizations and legal 
systems. It makes them work.” 
- Amartaya Sen 
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The research topic of this thesis is the Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) between the 
European Union (EU) and developing coastal states in Afr ca, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP). First the context of the topic will be presented and thereafter the conceptual approach 
applied to study it will be introduced. Because of limitations on time and resources the 
conceptual framework will be applied on the specific case of Mozambique, and the reasons 
for selecting this case will also be explained in the following. The research questions that the 
thesis will aim to answer are also presented, together with an elaboration on the objectives 
behind conducting the research project. At the end of the introduction the structure of the 
thesis will be presented.  
1.1 Context 
The world’s fisheries resources are increasingly being fully and over-exploited, due to a 
growing demand for fish in the markets around the world. In addition the processes of 
globalisation have connected resources, producers and m rkets around the world together in 
new ways, and the fish chain –from ocean to table – today extends over large geographical 
distances. The fisheries sector in the EU is a prime example of this, as it comprises a large 
historically developed fleet, resources in a poor state, a large number of people in need of 
employment and consumers demanding more and more fish. But the Union is not capable of 
satisfying its own needs and is, in addition to imports, dependent on establishing access 
agreements with other coastal states in order to maintain their distant water fleets employed 
and supply their internal market. The EU today has 15 access agreements with ACP countries, 
and three with countries in the north (EC, 2011c).  
 The United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) has, since its 
introduction and worldwide implementations in the 1970s, constituted the legal framework for 
such agreements. The Convention entitles coastal states to establish exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of 200 nautical miles (nm), giving them both rights and duties in relation to 
exploitation and management of the resources in their zone. It also determines that coastal 
states that lack the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch in their own zone, shall allow 
other states access to the surplus of this catch throug  agreements or other arrangements. 
Agreements with developing states are, however, to be temporary and terminated when the 
coastal state have capacity to exploit the resources themselves (UNCLOS, 1982). 
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The fisheries agreement between the EU and ACP countries are considered to be an essential 
component of the north-south relationship, where developing countries typically grant access 
to developed countries because they lack capacity to do it themselves (Mwikya, 2006). The 
first generation of such agreements was characterised by “fish, pay and go – operations” and 
was heavily criticised through the 1990s, alongside an increased international awareness on 
global interconnectedness, responsibilities and the principle of sustainability. EU reformed 
their external policies entering the new millennium. A partnership approach to relations with 
ACP countries was introduced through the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000, while the 
objectives of sustainability, policy coherence and poverty alleviation became overarching 
(EC, 2006). As a part of this process EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was reformed in 
2002, with a focus on conservation and sustainable fish ries resources. A new integrated 
framework for fisheries agreements with third countries was also developed, and coherent 
with the new partnership approach the agreements were re-labelled “Fisheries Partnership 
Agreements” with the aim of equally benefitting both parties (EC, 2009). The overarching 
objective of the agreements is three folded and include: securing access for the EU fleet, 
supplying EU’s internal market and promoting sustainable development of the fisheries sector 
in third countries (COM, 2002). These objectives reflect different interests and stakeholders, 
some more powerful and influential in the governance process than others. The extent to 
which objectives are realised will depend on the int rplay between stakeholders and 
governors in this process. Critics argue that it is ea y to display objectives on paper, but much 
more challenging to commit to and achieve them. There are constant discussions on how EU 
can increase its governance performance and to a higher degree deliver what it promises on 
paper. In an attempt to address these and other weaknesses a new reform of the CFP is 
planned in 2012. There is a risk that a new set of paper objectives, with questionable practical 
realisation, will be developed. In relation to this, an assessment of what factors affect the 
outcome of governance processes is useful.   
1.2 Research approach 
Governing this type of partnership agreement involves numerous actors and components and 
a wide range of possible instruments, and the number and characteristics affects the governing 
system’s ability to reach set objectives. When governance outcomes are not as desired, the 
governors are often blamed. But in order to understand why a system fails to address certain 
objectives, it is wiser to study the whole fisheries system and analyse how fit the governing 
system actually is to handle the challenges involved. This approach also makes it possible to 
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assess how different components in the governance proc ss may reduce or potentially 
increase this ability. 
 Interactive governance, a concept first introduced by Kooiman in 2003 and further 
elaborated by members of the Fisheries Governance Network 
(www.marecentre.nl/fishgovfood/), may be used as a basis to commence this study. The 
governance object is through this framework divided into a System-to-be-Governed (SG), a 
Governing System (GS) and a set of Governing Interac ions (GI). Interactive governance 
theory argues that these systems are inherently diverse, complex and dynamic, and take place 
on various scales. The level of these characteristics may challenge the GS’s governing 
abilities, or in other words affect the systems governability. ‘Governability’ is defined as “the 
overall capacity for governance at any societal entity or system” (Kooiman, 2008:173), and 
can be used as a measure for how governable a particul  fishery or coastal system is. By 
developing a governability assessment framework, governance performance can be judged 
from the potential of the GS given the limitations of the governability related to the SG, GS 
and GI (Kooiman et al., 2005). 
 It is however further emphasized that weaknesses and failures in the systems need to 
be addressed through interventions at the three orders of governance. These orders are where 
the governing activities take place: first order con erns addressing daily problems; second 
order about building governing institutions and facilitating the instruments and mechanisms 
for governing first order; while third order involves ethics, values, norms and guiding 
principles forming the basis for the two former orders. By first posing questions related to the 
characteristics of the three systems and further at all governance orders, a framework for 
analysis comes into place and new ways of addressing challenging issues may be found 
(Onyango and Jentoft, 2010).  
1.3 The case of Mozambique 
Mozambique, a underdeveloped and poor country - rich in marine resources, is one of EU’s 
contracting fisheries partners. Previous agreements between the two have involved fishing 
rights to shallow – and deep water shrimp, but the current agreement includes access to highly 
migratory species only (KusiLimitada, 2008). The agreement is hence a so-called tuna 
agreement, as opposed to a mixed agreement involving rights to a wider range of fish stock in 
their partners’ EEZs (EC, 2011c). As there is no domestic capacity to exploit offshore tuna 
resources, Mozambique is dependent on foreign fleets to generate value from these resources. 
At present the offshore fisheries is composed of EU vessels fishing under the FPA, as well as 
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Chinese, Korean and Japanese fleets. There are neith r landing nor production facilities in the 
country, and no value creation in addition to the financial compensation paid for access is 
therefore acquired by Mozambique (Informant 12; Eide, 2004). 
 The three folded objective of the FPA framework, mentioned in section 1.1, is the 
basis also for the agreement between Mozambique and EU. While securing access for the 
fleet and supplying the internal market, the EU also aims to promote fisheries sector 
development in the third country. Since Mozambique is a poor country with great potential for 
the fisheries sector to contribute both to value generation and food security, it is a well suited 
case for an assessment of contributions and limitations related to achieving set objectives of 
the FPA framework. 
 The current FPA between Mozambique and EU expires at the end of December 2011, 
making it especially relevant to assess the agreement and its potential at the present time. In 
addition, a well-established dialogue and cooperation between Norwegian and Mozambican 
fisheries institutions made it more efficient to facilitate a network of informants and collect 
data within the limited timeframe of a master thesis project.    
1.4 Research questions 
In order to define the boundaries of the thesis, research questions are developed. The 
formulation of these questions will decide the scope f the research, and the aim will be to 
answer the questions – neither more nor less. 
 
Three research questions form the foundation of this research project:  
 
a) How well do the capacities of the GS match the needs of the SG? 
 
b) What components of the SG, GS and GI are limiting the ability to realize set 
governance objectives, in this case achieving one of the overarching objectives of the 
FPA framework: promoting sustainable development of the third countries fisheries 
sector? 
 
c) How may interactions of first and second order governance enhance this ability?  
 
The first question aims to identify if the governing system inherits the necessary capacities to 
govern the FPA. The second question seeks to assess which components of the governance 
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object (including all three sub-systems) challenge and potentially reduce the realization of 
objectives in practice. The overall objective of the FPA framework is as mentioned threefold, 
but the focus of this thesis will be on the most challenging one, i.e. promoting sustainable 
development of the third countries fisheries sector. The reason for this is that if this objective 
remains unrealized while the two other objectives, ensuring access for the EU fleet and 
supplying the internal EU market, are fulfilled the agreement will not deliver what it promises 
and in reality only be of a commercial nature. The last research question aims to identify 
interactions that can enhance the governing system’ ability to realize this objective. Since the 
objectives and principles of meta-order governance are set, the aim will be to suggest forms of 
interactions at first and second order that can enhance the ability to realize the given 
objective. 
1.5 Research objectives 
The main objective of this project is to conduct an exploratory and critical study of the 
governance process of EU’s Fisheries Partnership Agreements and assess to what extent they 
manage to realise their set objectives – focusing on the objective of supporting development 
of the fisheries sector in third countries. It is easi r to put down objectives on paper, than 
committing to and realizing them in practice. If the actions of the EU are to be legitimate and 
the agreements are to benefit their poor contracting parties the way they envision, it is of vital 
importance that commitment is connected to action and not merely a signature. Governance is 
an ongoing process, and continuous studies and evaluations of various aspects of the process 
are therefore important to assess how things are dev loping.  
 The overarching objective of the thesis is to take  journey, both academically and 
personally. As the governability assessment framework is an approach still in its developing 
phase, this thesis will be another experiment of its applicability. It may be seen as a guide 
showing where the pieces of the puzzle may be found, a  through the process of using it the 
picture will first be put together before an assessment of how compatible the pieces actually 
are will be conducted. The exploratory form of the project makes it difficult to assess what 
level and quality of data can be anticipated, as well as what challenges may emerge while 
conducting the research. This is one of the risks when conducting exploratory research, but 
the choice of doing so is legitimised by the need to identify what challenges exist and where 
the lack of data is a limiting factor. The results can thus give other researchers a basis for 
more detailed studies of the components identified through this thesis.  
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At a personal level the objective is to attain as much knowledge and experience as possible. 
The interdisciplinary nature of the subject of the sis presents a unique opportunity to learn 
more about several dimensions of fisheries governance, i cluding scientific, institutional, 
socio-economic and political components. The objectiv  is hence to achieve a multi-
dimensional comprehension of the challenges that exis in the process of fisheries governance 
and enhance my abilities to assess and discuss how uch challenges may be addressed.  
 The study will also be part of PovFish, an international academic project including 
partners from 15 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and America, with the aim of providing 
new insight to the connections between fisheries and the issues of poverty and food security 
(PovFish, 2011). 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 will give a presentation of the conceptual and theoretical backbone of the thesis and 
the governability assessment framework will be explained in detail. An insight into the 
methodological approach employed during the project will thereafter be given in chapter 3.   
Chapter 4 contains a presentation of the history, framework and status of FPAs in general, as 
well as of the case of Mozambique. The assessment of system properties and attributes related 
to the FPA between EU and Mozambique will be presented in chapter 5, before being 
discussed in the following chapter. The discussion will be based on the research questions, 
and focused on how the ability to reach desired objective hinges upon how well GS is 
matched with SG. Assessing levels of governability will help identify what challenges the GS 
needs to address and its ability to do so. Using the assessment as a basis makes it possible to 
suggest how interventions of first and second order governance potentially could improve the 
level of governability and hence the ability to achieve the desired outcome. A concluding 
chapter will contain a short summary of the findings of the thesis in relation to the research 





2. Theoretical perspective and Conceptual framework 
Developments of the last century have made the fishries sector increasingly complex and the 
task of fisheries management correspondingly more challenging. A wide range of approaches 
to managing fisheries has been employed, with varying success. It is often difficult to get a 
full overview of the actors, components and processes comprising the fisheries sector and the 
level of insight will thus often determine the level of successful management. Conceptualising 
the fisheries system in a clear and well-organised manner may help achieve this. According to 
Blaikie (2010) concepts are the means applied to connect theory with the empirical world. 
Through identifying relevant conceptual variables and defining an operational procedure to 
measure them, a framework for organising empirical f ndings and match them with theoretical 
perspectives comes into place.  
 An interactive governance approach is applied to conceptualise the research object and 
frame the empirical data of this thesis. The configuration of this approach and its theoretical 
context will be elaborated in the following chapter.     
2.1 Fisheries governance in the context of globalization 
The entire world society, and the fisheries sector with it, was restructured during the twentieth 
century: first the industrial revolution boosted production levels and new-inventions replaced 
manual procedures; later the transition to capitalism changed trade relations and as a 
consequence also the structure of societies and how pe ple organized their livelihoods. The 
world got more interconnected through this multifaceted process of globalization, defined as: 
 
“(…) the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of 
interregional flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to shift or transformation in the 
scale of human social organization that links regions and continents” 
(Taylor et al., 2007:2). 
     
As a consequence of this process the challenges of fisheries managers have become greater, 
including concerns related to overexploitation, allocation, employment and food supply. 
Variables and relationships multiplied, and both problems and opportunities were generated. 
The relationship between developed and developing countries is a prime example of this, seen 
as globalization has the potential to both catalyze and obstruct development – to feed and rob 
the poor.   
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 Managing fisheries has become a much more comprehensive task, involving high 
levels of responsibilities and the need to adopt a bro der focus has prevailed. In general terms 
the technical management approach has gradually been replaced by the broader notion of 
governance. (The term fisheries governance will from now on be consistently applied instead 
of fisheries management throughout the thesis). There is no consensus on its definition, and it 
is thought to mean different things to different peo l . According to Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 
(2009) the word itself has its origin in the Greek v rb kubernân – to pilot or steer, and it was 
for a long time exclusively associated with governme t. But especially after the World Bank 
introduced the norm of ‘good governance’ to international development in the beginning of 
the 1990s, it became more common to use governance to characterise a broader more value 
based form of governing. In other words a process where not only the state, but also the 
market and the civil society have prominent positions (Kooiman et al., 2005). According to 
Gray (2005) this probably came as a result of skepticism towards the existing governing 
system and its deficiencies, and the need for a broder and more holistic knowledge base for 
decision making. He further claims that even though governance can have many meanings, 
there are two main interpretations of the concept: The first is as a structure for decision 
making, i.e. hierarchical, market run or participatve forms; while the second interpretation 
involves principles with focus on certain elements and Gray uses the definition taken from the 
reform text of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002 to highlight this view: 
 
“Governance means rules, processes, and behavior that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence” (Gray, 2005:2). 
 
Globalization has made the fisheries more open and vulnerable, the connections between local 
and global level greater and the effects of governance more influential. Power has become a 
forceful instrument, and should be exercised with caution. In order to understand the 
interconnections and develop strategies to deal with the many challenges of a globalised 
fisheries sector, a global approach to fisheries governance is needed. Interactions, linkages 
and relationships that extend beyond local and natio l levels must be emphasized and 




2.2 Interactive governance 
As a result of the lengthened value chains through globalization, governance has become 
more and more diverse, complex, dynamic and scale-dep ndent over time. Since fisheries 
governors often have overlooked these characteristics, the governing system as a consequence 
has not reflected real insight and understanding of the governance object. It is however 
difficult to take consideration of all aspects of a system, and it is necessary to conceptualise 
the governance object in such a manner that the most i portant elements can be assessed. 
One approach developed for this purpose is the multidimensional interactive governance 
model. Interactive governance as a concept was first int oduced to fisheries by the Dutch 
social scientist Jan Kooiman in 2003, who further elaborated its conceptual basis together 
with members of the academic network FISHGOVFOOD in the book “Fish for life” 
(Kooiman et al., 2005). Interactive governance is defined by Kooiman et al. (2005:17) as: 
 
  "The whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal 
opportunities; including the formulation and application of principles guiding those 
interactions and care for institutions that enable and control them." 
 
The framework suggests an alternative approach for studying and understanding the process 
of fisheries governance, involving both an analytical and normative dimension. In other words 
“what is, and what should be”. The conceptual basis involves the use of a three system model 
to study a governance object, its properties and attributes, and assess how capacities and 
needs affect governance outcomes. The governance object is divided into a System-to-be-
governed (SG) which is partly natural and partly social, a Governing system (GS) and a 
system of Governing Interactions (GI) which connects the two first ones. This is shown 































(adapted from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009:113)). 
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A systematic study of the properties and attributes of the governance process hence creates a 
framework for analysis. The figure presented is also of a normative format, as the two main 
systems are isomorphic in size. This illustrates that e more compatible the characteristics of 
the GS are with the characteristics of the SG, the more responsive will the GS be and the level 
of coherence between the governance outcome and the set objective will increase. This 
process of matching, according to Jentoft (2006a), consists of planning and institutional 
design. Where the two systems intersect, characteristics meet and system of GIs take place 
with their own set of attributes affecting the final outcome. Interactions facilitate governance 
mechanisms, and they are shaped by forces such as power and consent (Kooiman et al., 2005, 
Song and Chuenpagdee, 2010). According to Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009) the outcome 
can be assessed according to indicators on efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy and justice.  
  
The multi-dimensional approach of interactive governance, illustrated in figure 2, further 
emphasizes the need to study three other components of governing activities: 
Elements 
The intentions behind governance are shaped by elements. These include: images of the 
governance object and its challenges developed to illustrate scenarios and accompanying 
sollutions; instruments chosen to address these challenges as a response to how hey analyse 
their images; and actions taken to put the instruments to use.  
Orders of governance  
Further, it is important to understand that interactions are not of a simple and straight forward 
design, but rather consists of multiple layers or orders. The outer layer of interactions, first 
order governance, is most visible and represents daily interactions f a practical matter. Then 
there is second order governance, including the institutional framework enabling interactions 
of first order. While the most inner layer involves meta – or third order governance, 
representing the ethical and social principles underpinning governance interactions.   
Modes of governance 
Last, but not least, it is important to remember that all interactions take place within 
structures. This does in other words mean modes or styles that are used to govern interactions. 
In some systems the government is solely responsible for governing, and a hierarchical 
governance mode is hence applied. Other systems govern their int ractions themselves and 
are therefore examples ofself-governance. When the government and the people share the 
responsibilities of governing it is called co-governance. However, most of the time different 
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modes are used to govern different interactions and the systems are therefore commonly 
hybrid of all governance modes (Kooiman et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the multiple levels of interactive governance  
2.3 Governability 
The concept of measuring degrees of governance received attention, especially after the WB 
introduced “good governance” as a measure for succesful governing of states, with the 
opposite being failed states. According to the WB there are especially three aspects affecting 
state governance: the type of political regime; the process of which authority is exercised with 
a view to development and the capacity of governments to formulate and effectively 
implement policies. Other agents, such as the UN, have developed a set of criteria to judge 
governance performance by and the concept has gained  prominent position within the 
development discourse (Allen and Thomas, 2000). In the extension of the governance 
approach to fisheries governability similarly was presented as a measure of the overall 
governance capacity and quality of a societal entity or system. While applying the interactive 
governance framework as a basis, governability can be assessed in relation to levels of the 
four system properties – diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale. The process involves 
identifying the needs and strengths of governance by assessing the match between system 
needs and governance capacities. High system property levels will generally challenge the 
(Source: Kooiman et al., 2005:325). 
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capacities of the governing system. Further, an examin tion of the different orders of 
governance interactions can provide useful insight on how to increase governability by 
making use of governance potential and identify factors reducing this potential (Kooiman et 
al., 2005).   
 Interactive governance theory suggests three ways of increasing governability: One is 
to empower the GS through giving the governors increased access to additional authority, 
jurisdictional, financial and intellectual instruments; the other way is to promote action from 
the inside of SG by reducing disturbing elements and make control easier; while the third 
option is to organize GI in such a manner that interactions between the two systems are more 
interactive, constructive and less costly. One way of doing this is to create arenas for 
communication, where knowledge can be shared and cotribute to creating common 
understanding of procedures and actions that are needed (Jentoft, 2007). Governability is 
however not a static value, but constantly changing as a response to internal and external 
factors. Interactive governance therefore highlights t e importance of developing an 
operational framework for conducting empirical studies, and matrices with questions related 
to properties and orders of the different systems have been developed for this purpose.      
 Governability is a concept under development and the importance of experimenting 
with its applicability, while searching for new solutions for system problems is important. 
Kooiman et al. (2005) emphasise that there is no clear cut procedure on how to assess 
governability, but the approach rather offers a pers ctive on how to study ways of improving 
governance. The steps to be taken are not always visible, but appear through an explorative 
research process aiming for real insight to a present-time situation (Kooiman et al., 2005). A 
framework to initiate this process is however develop d and presented in the next section.        
2.4 A framework for assessing governability 
The system based interactive governance model is used a  a basis for assessing the 
governability of a governance object. The structure and application of the framework is still 
under development and should be approached in an explorative manner. Some reference and 
starting points are however suggested in the following.  
2.4.1 Governability assessment 
SG and GS have inherent properties determining the needs and capacities of governance, 
while the attributes of GI affect its form and performance. By identifying and determining 
levels for these characteristics, the level of governability of a fisheries or coastal system can 
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be found. This because high property levels normally translate into low levels of governability 
and vice versa, while high levels of attributes indicate high governability. Levels range from 
low to high, and are determined on a comparative analytical basis.  
This section will contain a presentation of the main system properties and how they appear 
within the SG and GS, as well as which attributes of the GIs are of relevance when assessing 
the governability of a system. 
 
Diversity  
- characterizes how different entities help form the system, in other words how different they 
are and to what extent they function as a source of inn vation on one side and disturbance on 
the other. It is generally presumed that the higher diversity of components, the harder it is to 
develop a high level of governability. Globally, fisheries are highly diverse and the need for a 
broad interactive approach will generally appear and challenge the capacities of the GS to 
facilitate this. The relevant attribute for GIs will be related to participation in this process.   
 







Size of resource base or number of species involved in a SG. Most often at a higher level in the 
tropical oceans than in the more temperate arctic waters.  
The diversity of stakeholders with an interest in the SG will be determined by socio-economic 
factors. There may be several fleet segments part of a fishery, with motives ranging from 
maximising revenue to securing food for the family. Since the marine resources generally belong to 
the coastal state as a whole, and can contribute to food security, employment, state revenue and 
foreign exchange earnings, even people not directly part of the fisheries may have an interest in the 
fisheries. Future generations also have a great interest in the fisheries, and can be accounted for. 
GS The number of actors and actions constituting the GS. These may be both formal and informal, and 
of small or large size. 
Attribute Participation 
GI Diversity will determine the number of pieces needed to get a complete picture of the systems. The 
higher level of participation, the more interests are ccounted for. Generally this will increase the 
level of governability, but one should be aware that it may be challenging to organise a large 
number of actors and it is a risk that governability may be reduced.     
 
Complexity  
- is an indicator on how relations between parts of the system, the system as a whole and 
between the system and its environment are composed. Th  construction of the chain of 
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interaction and the spatial and temporal distances involved determine the level of complexity 
of a system. The chain of interaction is very seldom linear and stable, and it is important to 
make room for different patterns of development in order to improve governability. The level 
of communication attributed to GIs will determine the outcome of this. 
 









How species relate to their ecosystem, as a habitat and feeding place. Some species only feed and 
spawn under specific conditions, while others have a more generalist behaviour and feed 
opportunistically. The greater their levels of needs are, the higher is the complexity of the natural 
system. 
How complex stakeholder interactions are depend on how conflicting their interests are, and how 
they manage to interact with each other. If interests are many and conflicting, the complexity is 
ranged high. 
GS How actors and actions relate to each other determin s the complexity of the system. Great 
variation and inconsistency between them will reduce governability, whilst consistent relations will 
increase the level of governability. 
Attribute  Communication 
GI Complexity will make communication and acquiring information more challenging. 
To what extent interactions relate to each other and information is shared will affect the level of 
governability. If interactions are coherent and information is shared efficiently, governability will 
be high.   
 
Dynamics  
- refers to the tension in the system that creates th  flow of energy, materials and information, 
and can create potential for both change and disturbance. The processes of globalisation bring 
with them a high level of dynamics, which reinforces the levels of dynamics and complexity. 
The GIs ability of adaptation will determine how well the GS is able to adapt to he level of 
dynamics. 
 








The biological and physical changes occurring in the natural system over time, and what drives 
them. A SG influenced by a wide range of drivers, will have a high level of dynamics while a less 
exposed system will have a low level. How robust and resilient a system is will further determine 
how it reacts to the various drivers, and following how vulnerable the system is.  
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Social: The dynamics of stakeholder is linked to changes in their composition, values and attitudes over 
time, and the drivers of these processes. If their composition continuously changes, governability 
will be reduced.   
GS Changes in the institutions, mechanisms and measures in the GS, and the drivers behind them. A 
high level of dynamics will give a low level of governability, and vice versa. 
Attribute Adaptation 
GI The system’s ability to learn and adapt will depend on how dynamic and quick responding the GIs 
are.   
 
Scale  
- is another system property, focusing on the geographical and spatial limitations of the 
systems. The limits will often depend on the observer, and it is important that these are clear. 
If several GSs operate within the same limits, a governability problem easily can arise. 
According to Jentoft (2007), defining scale of the different systems makes it easier to assess 
how compatible governance is to the governance challenge. The extent to which interactions 
involve collaboration will affect this level. 
 








Spatial and temporal range of a natural system and its productivity. 
A large and highly productive ecosystem will involve a lower degree of governability than smaller 
and less productive one. 
Where stakeholders are found: local, national, regional or international. 
The more wide spread stakeholders are found, the low r will the level of governability probably be.  
GS The size, range and function of the GS will determine its scale. A small, well arranged system with 
few functions will most likely give higher levels of governability than if the scale level is high.    
Attribute Collaboration 
GI If governance involves high levels of scale, it is of high relevance how interactions are channelled 
within and across these scales. The level of appreciation and collaboration through the GIs will 
affect the overall governability.  
 
By conducting this assessment in a well-organised manner, the results can be used to give 
governors and evaluators a clearer overview of the governance process and what kinds of 
interactions are needed to make governance more effective. 
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2.4.2 Exploring the orders of governance 
In addition to studying the system characteristics of the governance object, it is also useful to 
explore the dimensions of interactions in a more thorough manner. As there are no simple 
solutions to governance challenges, appropriate interac ions including all three orders of 
governance are needed. By studying these orders and how they relate to the governance 
object, a deeper understanding of the governing interac ions will be developed, as well as give 
insight into elements and modes surrounding them. The objective is to assess how well- 
adjusted interactions are to produce desired governance outcomes, and suggest alternative 
ways of achieving this through interactions at one r several of the governance orders.   
 First order, including problem-solving and opportuni y creation, can be assessed 
according to their effectiveness. Successful solutins are equivalent with interactions of high 
governability, while inadequate solutions indicate lower levels. Second order, i.e. building 
governing institutions and facilitate interactions of first-order, need to be assessed in relation 
to their legitimacy. If those being governed find the institutions legitimate, the interactions 
will lead to a higher level of governability. On the other hand, when rules and organisations 
are poorly matched with the problems they are meant to address, governability will be low. 
Institutions should therefore be evaluated on a regular basis and reformed when necessary. 
Meta order involves interactions that govern governance and should be assessed according to 
their level of responsibility. If interactions reflct the overarching principles and objectives, 
governability is higher than when these principles not are accounted for (Kooiman et al., 
2005) .    
 The conceptual framework presented above is evidently useful for studying complex 
research objects, such as the FPAs. It is however important to be aware that the use of such a 
comprehensive conceptual approach requires careful consideration of which methods should 
be applied to carry out the study. The methodology applied will be presented in the next 
chapter.      
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3. Methodology   
Studying the European Union’s Fisheries Partnership Agreements through an interactive 
governance framework while applying a governability assessment as basis for discussion, is a 
highly explorative exercise. Both the research topic and the conceptual framework applied to 
study it are complex structures under development, and the research design, as a consequence, 
needs to have a dynamic form while it is important that the methods applied are standardized. 
According to Kvale and Brinkman (2010:99) the original Greek meaning of the word 
methodology translates into “the road to the destination”, andthe aim of this chapter will be to 
draw up a detailed road map of the journey undertakn through this thesis. In other words 
describing the point of departure, justifying choices of direction and design and evaluating the 
data acquired in order to carry out the research project and arrive at a concluding point.          
3.1 Research purpose 
There are multiple purposes behind conducting this research project. First of all, it is an 
opportunity to provide empirical data and assessments of the research topic. The EU’s 
Fisheries Partnership Agreements are continuously sbject of critical discussions, especially in 
connection with the upcoming reform of EU’s CFP in 2012, and research is therefore essential to 
ensure that decisions are based on factual knowledge and not speculations. The objective is that 
this study can contribute to giving evaluators and decision makers a more systematic and detailed 
overview of challenges and potential surrounding the governance process of the FPAs. The 
agreement between the EU and Mozambique expires in 2011, making a detailed assessment of the 
current state of affairs especially relevant as part of the process of renewing the agreement. There 
exists very little research literature about this specific agreement, and one of the purposes of the 
project will therefore be to increase the level of available information.  
 Another purpose of the research project is to make empirical use of the conceptual 
framework and contribute to its development. By applying it to study the FPAs, its wide usage 
will be demonstrated. Limitations on available data nd time to conduct the project may reduce 
the ability to fill in the framework in detail. Nonetheless, it will be useful to apply it in an 
explorative manner in order to identify which components constitute the main challenge as well as 
which research areas are lacking data.   
 The thesis will be part of the PovFish project, and the purpose of conducting this research 
will therefore also be to provide new insight to the connections between fisheries and the issues of 
poverty and food security. It is highly relevant to s udy the governance of the FPAs in this regard, 
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as there are strong connections between the FPA fisheries and poverty and food security, and the 
potential for increasing the connections are high.  
3.2 Research questions, strategy and data selection 
According to Blaikie (2010:57): “a research project is built on the foundation of its research 
questions”. The nature of these questions determines the strategy needed to answer them and 
hence the scope of the research. The questions of this project, presented in chapter 1.4, are of 
the type “what” and “how”. What-questions require a descriptive answer, while how-
questions are related to change related to practical outcomes and interventions. An inductive 
research strategy is chosen to answer the two typesof questions in the thesis, providing a 
logic for conducting the research. The inductive research strategy involves collecting data by 
operationalising concepts, searching for patterns in the data and developing limited theoretical 
generalisations (Blaikie, 2010). The research question  and the strategy chosen to answer 
them determine what type of data needs to be collected. In order to keep this research project 
within limits of the time and resources available, a case study research is employed as a 
strategy and method for selecting data. According to Yin (2009:4) “[the use of case studies] 
allows the researcher to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events”, 
and is therefore well-suited to answer ‘how’-questions.  
 There is a range of methods available for data colle tion, and they may be both 
qualitative and quantitative. The nature of the research questions of this thesis indicates that 
qualitative data, in other words not numbers, are ne ded to answer them and a combination of 
methods is applied to acquire these. 
 
According to Blaikie (2010) data can generally be divided into three categories: 
- Primary data refers to data required by the researcher(s) responsible for designing a project, 
and is ‘new’ data acquired to answer specific research questions. It is in other words the 
result of direct contact between a researcher and a source, and is generated by the application 
of particular methods. There exists accurate knowledge on how and why data is collected. 
- Secondary data is raw data collected by others, either for some general information purpose 
or for a specific research project. A secondary user can review and make use of such data, but 
needs to be aware of the original purpose of collecting the data.  
- Tertiary data have been analysed either by the researcher(s) who generated them or by a user 
of secondary data. Raw research material is often not available, and a review of such data 
will probably be concentrated around results of an analysis.   
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Blaikie further suggests a range of qualitative methods for collecting these data, including: 
participant observation, observation, focused interviews, in-depth interviews, oral/life 
histories, focus groups/group interviews and content analysis of documents. In this thesis in-
depth interviews with relevant informants will be used to collect primary data, while a content 
analysis of existing documents will provide secondary and tertiary data used in a 
complementary manner. The research design, including what activities were undertaken 
through the course of the research project, will be described and justified in the next chapter.       
3.3 Research design  
In order to validate the results found from conducting a research projects, the research 
methods applied need to be accounted for and justified. The procedures followed through the 
course of producing this master thesis is therefore d cumented and assessed in the following.  
3.3.1 Literature review  
The first phase of the project involved reviewing second and tertiary literature to get an 
overview of the research topic and the challenges involved, and develop more specific and 
insightful research questions. According to Blaikie (2010) a literature review is the bridge 
between the project and the current state of knowledge on the topic, and the results from it 
may be used in different parts of the thesis in order to provide background information or to 
supplement primary data findings.  
 The starting point for the project involved reading a book about how to begin and how 
to finish a master thesis (Everett and Furseth, 2004). Thereafter methodological literature, 
including Yin (2009), Blaikie (2010) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2010), was more thoroughly 
reviewed in order to design the structure of the res arch project and assess which methods 
were best suited to collect the required data. In order to comprehend in detail how to apply the 
conceptual framework, the book Fish for life. Interactive Governance for Fisheries dited by 
Kooiman et. al (2005) was the most important source. In addition articles by Chuenpagdee 
and Jentoft (2009), Onyango and Jentoft (2010), Song and Chuenpagdee (2010), Scholtens 
(2009) and Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) provided us ful examples of the framework’s 
empirical usage.  
 The next step in the process involved reviewing literature about the FPAs. The web 
pages of the EC (2011c) provided the first set of factual information about the FPAs, before 
two evaluations conducted by the EC itself in 1999 and 2010 provided detailed data. A 
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comparative study and technical report facilitated by Walmsley et al. (2007a), a workshop 
report by EBCD (2010) and a report by SSNC (2009) were the most important sources of 
secondary data. While several reports from CFFA (2005a;b; 2006; 2009 and 2010) WWF 
(2005a; b and 2010) were the most important sources of tertiary data related to FPAs in 
general. Books and brochures about the EU system (Bo berg and Stubb, 2003, Borchardt, 
2010) were also assessed in order to get a deeper und standing of the governing system.     
 In order to read up on the case of Mozambique, reports prepared by Eide (2004), 
Degnbol et al. (2002) together with Norwegian support d cuments (MoF, 2009) provided 
general information about the fisheries sector in Mozambique. There is however not much 
literature available on the specific case of the FPA between the EU and Mozambique. Only 
two studies were found, one being a report facilitated by the consultants Kusi Limitada (2008) 
concerning the economic and social impacts of the FPA and the other an analysis conducted 
by Munyunki (2006) of the fisheries agreements and implication on the Mozambican fisheries 
industry. IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) reports were reviewed in order to attain 
secondary data about the natural system, as were biological studies facilitated by Potier 
(2004), Govinden (2010), Fraile (2010) and the web pages of Fish Base. While a project 
report prepared by Oceanic Developpement (2005) was the most important source of 
information about the European tuna sector.  
3.3.2 Operationalising the conceptual framework 
Having a complex conceptual framework with theoretical success is one thing, making it 
operational in practice is a different matter. By posing questions related to the system 
variables, i.e. properties, attributes and orders, two matrices are developed in order to keep 
track of what information is needed and secure systema ic documentation of empirical data. 
Through developing and answering these questions, needs and capacities of the governance 
system are found and assessed. Concepts are in other words applied as instruments to measure 
the levels of given variables, thus providing a systematic basis for assessing the governance 
process and make decisions on how to increase the overall ability to realise set objectives. 
 
The first matrix, shown in table 5, contains questions concerning levels of system properties 
related to the three systems. These levels are conne ted to governability and will have 





















What is the level of 
biodiversity: Species 
involved in the FPA 
fisheries, the health of 
these and the ecosystem 
they belong to? 
 
Who are involved/have 






Which formal and 
informal institutions 
and authorities 
constitute the GS, 
and what capacities 
do they represent?  
Representation 
What are the existing 
forms of interactions 




How are species, 
habitats and ecosystems 
inter-linked? 
 







How do the 















What are the biological 
and physical changes 
that take place over 
time: Long term, short-
term, seasonal; main 
internal and external 
drivers? 
 
Are there changes in the 
stakeholder composition, 
values and attitudes over 
time: main drivers and 
consequences? 
 
Have there been any 








How adaptive are the 
forms of 
interactions, in 





What is the size and 
geographical range of 
the ecosystem where the 
FPA fisheries take place; 
natural boundaries, 
system uniqueness and 
functions?  
 
What is the size and 
geographical range of the 
social system: 





What is the size and 








How well do actors 







The second matrix, table 6, is composed by questions related to the three orders of governance 
interactions. Identifying these interactions provides an opportunity to assess how they 
 22
influence the governability of the systems and the ability to realise desired governance 
outcomes, as well as suggesting what kind of interac ions are needed to improve this ability.      
 
Table 6: Matrix related to orders of governance 
Variables for assessment SG GS GI 
First order:  
Decision making 
What are the social and 
ecological impacts of the 
governance decisions 
related to FPAs? 
What governing modes are 
used to make these 
decisions? 
How do individuals, 
groups and governing 




How are practices, 
interests and power 
institutionalized? 
How are costs and benefits 
distributed between 
stakeholders? 
Equally shared between 
both parties?  
How does the institutional 
set-up enable and restrict 
governance interactions? 
How is power exercised, 
responsibilities and 
mandates distributed and 
with what outcomes? 
What are the institutional 
characteristics of 
governing interactions? 




Third (meta) order: 
Values 
What values, principles 
and norms underpin the 
actions, institutional 
formation, decision-
making and power 
relations? 
How do values, norms and 
principles of governing 
institutions relate to 
problem definition, agenda 
setting and conflict 
resolution?  
How are values, principles 
and norms shared among 
stakeholders in their 
interactions? 
Level of coherence 
between various policy 
areas? 
3.3.3 Collecting primary data 
Primary data was collected by conducting semi-structu ed in-depth interviews with relevant 
informants. Informants included representatives from different institutions involved in 
governing the agreements, as well as private fisheries consultants. The interviews took place 
during one month in Mozambique and one week in Brussels. In addition some data was 
acquired through emails and phone calls with informants not available for direct interviewing.  
 Inspired by Yin (2009), a project protocol was developed in order to ensure an 
overview of the research project. Instruments, procedures and objectives were drawn up, 
including an interview guide formulating both verbal (level 1) and mental (level 2) questions 
that needed to be answered. Because of the exploratory nature of the study, open-ended 
questions were put together aiming to give interviews a dynamic form.  
Kvale and Brinkmann (2010) suggest that interviewers can take the role of a miner or a 
traveler, where the first refers to digging out data through an investigating style of 
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interviewing while the latter involves taking a more explorative and informal approach. The 
last approach was applied in this project.   
 Most interviews were arranged well in advance, but the time informants had available 
varied. General questions about the informant’s position and tasks were asked to start off the 
interview, before open-ended questions about the topic gave new insight and lead to more 
specific follow-up questions. Almost all interviews ere recorded, making it possible to 
maintain a flow of questions without stopping up to take detailed notes. The recordings were 
later transcribed, in other words written down on paper, making it easier to analyse and apply 
the data obtained.   
3.4 Review of data sources 
Research results are reviewed according to the reliability and validity of the sources and 
methods applied to obtain them. Reliability is linked to trustworthiness, and falsifying is a 
method to ensure it. Validity, on the other hand, is a measure for how well fit the choice of 
sources and methods are to obtain objectives of the given research project.          
3.4.1 Primary data 
According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2010) the quality of primary data obtained through 
interviews is determined from the strength and applicability of the knowledge produced. They 
further emphasise that even with extensive preparations, interviewing skills are only really 
acquired through practice. The quality of the primay data is thus partly linked to the level of 
interviewing experience, which naturally grew throughout the research process. Most 
informants were personally involved in governing the agreement and therefore had firsthand 
knowledge about the process and the challenges involved, and validity of informants is 
consequently high. Seen as a relative high number of informants were interviewed the process 
involved a certain degree of falsifying information. Even though it is impossible to know how 
much information informants shared and how accurate it was given, reliability of data 
retrieved is likely to be relatively high. It is however important to be aware of the fact that the 
informants attain positions, which can affect the level and nature of information they acquire, 
and the way they perceive it.         
3.4.2 Secondary data 
Reports from IOTC, together with communications, reports and evaluations published by the 
European Commission, constitute the sources of secondary data. IOTC is responsible for 
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managing the resources part of the FPA and data gathered from these reports hence is of high 
validity. The lack of reporting to IOTC does however make their level of reliability more 
questionable. Communications and factual reports from the EC necessarily involve both high 
levels of validity and reliability, since they constitute the foundation of the framework of the 
agreements. Evaluations produced by the EC also indicate valid and reliable data, but the 
possibility that these data can be inadequate or manipulated needs to be taken into account. 
There exist two evaluations of the agreement between th  EU and Mozambique, which 
naturally include data of high validity. The authorities in Mozambique were however not 
involved in any of these, and the reliability of data is therefore reduced.    
3.4.3 Tertiary data 
Tertiary data sources included articles, reports and evaluations prepared by independent 
researchers, governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Many 
of the sources provided general information about the topic, and even though several sources 
were concentrated on the agreements in West Africa they still provided valid data for the 
research project. Reliability of such sources is difficult to determine, and the data is applied 
with caution.  
3.5 Research limitations 
Lack of specific and detailed data made it challenging to get an overview of the research 
object, and reduced the ability to make thorough prepa ations before conducting interviews. 
The first interviews conducted hence included a wider range of general questions, than the 
subsequent ones. All interviews included communication in English and most informants held 
a high level, but the fact that both parties used a secondary language reduced the ability for 
accurate formulations and increased the possibility for misunderstandings. Some informants 
had much time available and shared information openly while others had limited time and 
were more reluctant to share information and this affected the dynamics of the interview and 
the level of data acquired. The informants with little ime for interviews did not answer 
request by e-mail either and some questions remained u answered. Last but not least, 
financial resources and time available for conducting he project put limitations on the 
duration and scope of research process.   
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3.6 Possibility for generalisation and relevance of the research project 
The quality of the research project is one of the main factors determining the possibility for 
generalisation, as well as its relevance. Data has been collected through interviews with key 
informants, and the findings should thus be of high relevance. The lack of detailed data has 
however reduced the accuracy of the results presentd, and this needs to be considered when 
references are being made.    
 The fact that the general framework is the same for all FPAs and most agreements 
similarly to the Mozambican FPA are tuna agreements be ween the EU and developing 
countries, makes it relevant to assume that many of the challenges identified in this case study 
may also exist in relation to governing other agreem nts of the same type. It is however 
necessary to be aware of the fact that the contextual differences of the FPAs may vary, and 
generalisation must be done with caution. The most important function of such a case study is 
probably therefore to identify where the most challenging components are found and where 
case specific research should be focused. In addition the research findings may also contribute 
to increasing the level of empirical data available about the FPAs, and possibly be applied to 
compare data from other similar studies. In this way the findings can contribute to studies 
with a wider range of data available and thus a grete  possibility for generalisation.  
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4. Fisheries Partnership Agreements  
The members of the EU have a long tradition of fishing in distant coastal waters, a type of 
fishery which since 1979 has been regulated through bilateral fisheries agreements negotiated 
by the EC (European Commission) on behalf of the European Union (Walmsley et al., 2007a). 
A presentation of the historical development, framework and status of these fisheries 
agreements, as well as specifically for the case of Mozambique, is given in the following.    
4.1 Historical development 
European fleets, mainly from Spain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal, historically 
developed large distant water fleets (DWFs). Especially during colonial times the presence of 
these fleets grew strongly in southern waters, and particularly the west –and east coast of 
Africa became important fishing grounds for the Europeans. However, during the second half 
of the 1900s territorial claims increased and the ground rules of the oceans were dramatically 
changed. From open access and resources belonging to all, a new legal framework came into 
place through the configuration and implementation of the United Nations’ Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Two conventions in 1956 and 1960 preceded the third and 
most influential one lasting from 1973 to 1982. The most important provisions of the 
UNCLOS III include the introduction of 200 nm EEZs, coastal state management 
responsibility and obligations on allowing other states access to surplus stocks through 
agreements or other arrangements (Walmsley et al., 2007a). These provisions were gradually 
implemented and the convention signed worldwide in the years that followed, but it was not 
ratified until the 60th state had signed the convention in 1994 (WWF, 2005a). According to 
Mwikya (2006) 99 percent of the world’s fisheries came under national jurisdiction as a result 
of this. The convention was presented as a ‘package deal”, to be accepted as a whole without 
the possibility to take reservation on any aspect.  
 The EU created a 200 nm EEZ in 1976, but did not sign the UNCLOS before 1988. 
The Union ‘s first fisheries agreement was signed with the United States in 1977 (IFREMER, 
1999), while the first southern agreement was signed with Senegal in 1979. The number of 
agreements increased the following decade especially after the two large DWF nations Spain 
and Portugal became members in 1986. The EU sought to sign agreements with countries in 
the areas where they already were fishing, and agreements with coastal states in western 
Africa, like Senegal, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Maurit nia, became very important - in 
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addition to a network of agreements that developed in the Indian Ocean (Walmsley et al., 
2007a). 
 In the late 1980s, after the UN in 1987 introduced the term Sustainable development i  
their report Our common future, discussions concerning environmental and societal issues 
were boosted. In 1992 the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED Earth Summit) was held in Rio de Janeiro, representing a turning point in relation to 
the topics of environment and development. Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan for global, 
national and local actions needed to attain sustainabil ty, was adopted by world leaders and a 
new awareness on global interconnectedness and environmental vulnerability spread 
internationally (UN, 1997). As part of this the United Nations Organization for Food and 
Agriculture (FAO) presented a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in 1995, giving a 
framework of principles and possible actions needed to attain sustainability in the fisheries. 
One of its main features was the principle of the precautionary approach, which urged policy 
makers and practitioners to anticipate harmful effects of an action before it occurs and by 
doing so account for risk involved related to any action. The same year the UN set up the 
Agreement on straddling fish stock and highly migrato y fish stocks, with the aim of ensuring 
long-term and sustainable exploitation of migrating fish. The agreement contained provisions 
on setting up Regional Fishery Management Organisations (RFMOs) that were to be 
responsible for managing highly migratory species in given geographical areas (FAO, 2011). 
 Through this international shift of focus, the fisheries agreements increasingly were 
subject to criticism both in relation to environmental and social aspects. Accusations were 
made on EU exporting overcapacity, increasing the risk of over-exploiting marine resources 
and reducing development of coastal states’ own fisher es sectors. The agreements were not 
guided by a comprehensive policy, but negotiated on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis within the 
general framework of the CFP. In relation to the process of reforming EU’s Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002, focusing on conservation and sustainable fisheries resource, 
this concern therefore was taken in. An integrated framework for fisheries agreements with 
third countries was developed, emphasising partnership and sustainable fisheries development 
(Walmsley et al., 2007b). According to the interactive governance theory a new governance 
image was thus created, and a new set of interactions were needed to meet new demands and 
expectations.   
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4.2 Framework 
All actions undertaken by the EU have to be within t e competence granted through two main 
treaties. The Consolidated treaty on the European Union (EU, 2008a) contains provisions on 
common values, principles and institutional arrangements of the Union. Article 21 states the 
following objective for the Union’s relationship with third countries:  
 
  “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organizations whic  share the principles referred to in the 
first sub-paragraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations.” 
 
The Consolidated treaty on the functioning of the European Union (EU, 2008b) includes more 
detailed provisions related the Union’s operations, the most important in this context being 
the establishment of a Common Fisheries Policy. The first time the treaty was signed, in 1970, 
fisheries were part of the Common Agricultural Policy and CFP was not separated and 
formally created until 1983. The CFP is based on four pillars, including conservation, 
structural, markets and international policies, with the most important provisions including the 
definition of EU as one fishing nation, the creation of common ‘Community waters’ and the 
principle of relative stability basing allocation of resources on historical percentages.   
 Other relevant provisions of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
include: a commercial policy seeking to achieve harmonious development and gradual 
liberalization of world trade; a social policy promting employment, improved living and 
working conditions; an environmental policy aiming to preserve, protect and improve the 
quality of the environment and promote international measures to do so; and a development 
cooperation policy supporting sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries, integration of developing countries into the world economy and the campaign 
against poverty. The two treaties are regularly amended by other treaties. The last amendment 
done, referred to as the Lisbon Treaty, came into force in December 2009 and focused on 
more participative and efficient decision making  (EU, 2010). 
 The Cotonou agreement, signed in 2000 and amended i  2010, is the more specific 
framework for relations between the EU and developing ACP countries. The agreement is a 
partnership for cooperation in relation to political, economic, trade and development matters, 
and is centred around the common objective of reducing poverty, consistent with the goal of 
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achieving sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the 
world economy. Articles 23 and 53 of the agreement co tain specific principles for the 
fisheries sector, including commitment to supporting sustainable economic sector 
development and negotiating sustainable and mutually s tisfactory fisheries agreements 
consistent with development strategies in the area (EC, 2006). 
 Shaped by the provisions of both the Cotonou agreements and the reformed CFP, an 
integrated framework for fisheries partnership agreem nts with third countries was, as already 
mentioned, presented in 2002. A cooperative partnership approach to agreements, focusing on 
sustainable exploitation, mutual benefits and development of the third country’s own fisheries 
sector was suggested. This framework is not legally v id, but the EC’s fisheries partnership 
relations are guided by a set of procedural mechanisms proposed in Council Conclusions from 
2004 (Witbooi, 2008). The agreements are to regard the UNCLOS as its most important 
internationally valid legal frame; apply to decisions made by regional organizations; be aware 
of the importance of the principles included in theFAO Code of Conduct for responsible 
fisheries; and establish the dialogue needed to imple ent third countries fisheries policies. 
The FPAs generally consist of the agreement itself, a technical protocol and a section of 
annexes and is normally valid for several years at a time. The flag state of a vessel is 
responsible for reporting catch numbers to FAO, and when necessary reporting data on highly 
migratory catches to the RFMO responsible in the geographical area of the catch. Specific 
reporting requirements are included in the protocol f the agreement (COM, 2007). 
 The Cotonou agreement also states that fisheries are intended to be WTO compatible, 
which include that financial contributions under the CFP need to be justified by the mutual 
interests of the two parties to invest in sustainable fisheries policy and not just a payment for 
access (CFFA, 2005). The fisheries should subsidy free, meaning that no financial 
contribution by a government or public body that confers benefit within the territory of a 
member should be allowed. Gorez and Riordan (2003), as a consequence of this, claim that 
the private sector needs to progressively take responsibility for the compensation. 
  An important part of the overall framework is also the Council Resolution on 
Fisheries and Poverty Reduction from 2001 calling for: fisheries agreements to be based on 
flexible adjustments of fishing possibilities according to resource assessments, 
implementation of protective measures for small-scae fisheries and subsistence fishing and a 
functional Monitoring-System of the environmental, improving economic and social impacts 
of the agreements (Gorez and Riordan, 2003, CFFA, 2005). An action plan for eradicating 
illegal, unreported, unregulated fisheries (IUU) and an Action Plan to improve stock 
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assessment outside Community Waters, are also relevant in the governance of the FPAs 
(CFFA, 2005). 
 To accelerate the Union’s progress towards achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the European Consensus on Policy Coherenc  for Development (PCD) came 
into force in 2005. Twelve relevant policy areas were chosen, with the aim of building 
synergies between them that can increase their potential in relation to the MDGs, and 
commitments were made on ensuring coherence between th se policy areas and the overall 
development objectives. Fisheries Partnership Agreements constitute one of these policies, 
and this policy is evaluated according to progress every two years (EC, 2011d). 
4.3 Status 
There are currently 14 FPAs in force between the EU and ACP countries and one with 
Greenland. These agreements are listed below. In addition the EU has three northern 
agreements with Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Island .   
 
Table 7: Fisheries Partnership Agreements in 2011  
Type of 
Agreement 






Greenland 31.12.2012 14 307 244 € 
Guinea Bissau 15.06.2011 7 500 000 € 
Mauritania 31.07.2012 From 86 000 000 € (1. Year) 
to 70 000 000 € (4. Year) 
Morocco 27.02.2012 36 100 000 € 
 
Tuna agreements – 
West Africa 
Cape-Verde 31.08.2011 385 000 € 
Gabon 02.12.2011 860 000 € 
Ivory Coast 30.06.2013 595 000 € 




Comoros 31.12.2013 615 250 € 
Madagascar 31.12.2012 1 197 000 € 
Mozambique 31.12.2011 900 000 € 




Kiribati 15.09.2012 478 400 € 
Micronesia 25.02.2010 
(new protocol in the 
ratification process) 
559 000 € 
Solomon Islands 08.10.2012 400 000 € 
Source: (EC, 2011a) 
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The FPAs cost the EU more than 150 million euro in 2009, equivalent to 16.8 percent of the 
total fisheries budget (SSNC, 2009). Four mixed agreements constitute 94 percent of the FPA 
budget (EBCD, 2010). According to a report commissioned by DG MARE (EC, 2009), 
approximately 340 vessels with an estimated combined gross tonnage (GT) approaching 
277 000 are fishing under these agreements. Tuna vessels (seiners, long liners and pole-and-
line vessels) represent 53 percent of the fleet; long iners and pole-and-line vessels dominating 
in numbers while the purse seiners in tonnage. While demersal fishing vessels (operating 
under the mixed agreements in West Africa) represent 43 percent of the fleet and 16 percent 
of the total tonnage and pelagic trawlers (operating u der the agreements with Morocco and 
Mauritania) account for only 3 percent of the fleet and 19 percent of the total tonnage. Spain 
accounts for 67 percent of the vessels and 51 percent of the GT fishing under the FPAs, 
including seiners, long liners and demersal trawlers. F ance accounts for 14 percent of the 
total number of vessels and 15 percent of the GT, half of which are seiners and the other half 
long liners. In addition Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, the United 
Kingdom, Greece, Poland and Germany also have vessels fishing under the FPAs. 
 The report further estimates that the average total ca ch from 2004-2007 caught under 
the FPAs are 403 663 tons, and suggests that the fleet’s turnover averaged 443 million euro 
per year in the same period. Demersal catches are low in quantities, but constitute almost half 
of the turnover; while the numbers related to pelagics are higher in terms of tonnage than 
value. Tuna represent approximately 25 percent bothin terms of quantity and value. Based on 
these estimations the FPA catches represent 8 percent of the Union’s catches and 3 percent of 
its total supplies. The fleets operating under the agreements generate an estimated average 
added value of 534 million euro, of which 71 percent accrue the EU, 13 percent is distributed 
amongst third countries and 16 percent is benefitting countries not involved in the agreements 
but are connected with their spin off activities. Most direct value addition is concentrated in 
five fisheries agreements, including Mauritania, Seych lles, Guinea Bissau, Greenland and 
Morocco. An average of 2250 Europeans and 4830 third country crew members were 
employed on FPA vessels form 2005-2008. It is estimated that each job at sea generate 
between 0,5 and 1,5 jobs on land in fisheries related sectors.  
 The CFP states that it is prohibited to increase the capacity of the European fleets 
regardless of fishing grounds. The Union therefore se ks to maintain the current agreements 
through improved terms, and re-establish some of the recently declined agreements (e.g. 
Senegal and Angola). The agreements have in general become less controversial the recent 
years, probably because the number of tuna agreements has increased and these are less in 
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conflict with local fisheries than mixed agreements i volving rights for demersal and pelagic 
species closer to the coast. The existing multispeces agreements, especially with Mauritania 
and Morocco, still generate a lot of debate. The Maurit nian agreement, the largest FPA both 
in terms of access and compensation, is controversial because the EU fleets compete with the 
local fishermen reducing the potential of the fisheries as a livelihood and a source to reduce 
poverty. In addition the state has become heavily dependent on the financial compensation 
linked to the FPA, making it difficult for the authorities to restrict access to over-exploited 
resources (CFFA, 2010). The Moroccan agreement on the other hand is disputed because it 
allows rights to fish in the waters of the controversially occupied West Sahara. The agreement 
is by many considered to violate international law since it fails to take into account the wishes 
and interests of the people of Western Sahara, which have been stipulated by the UN as the 
legal requirement for economic activity in the territory. Because the EU lacks information on 
how the agreement affects the local Saharawi people, the basis for the agreement is not 
legitimate. The agreement recently expired, and a temporary protocol is signed permitting 
continued fishing until February 2012 while EU is gven the opportunity to provide 
information about the links between the FPA and the Saharawi people. The Parliament can 
however refuse this continuation, and what will happen is unclear (FishElsewhere, 2011).  
 Critics claim that the EU’s handling of controversial agreements show that when their 
credibility is tried, they fail and it is claimed that the EU is not doing what it says and not 
saying what it does. They further argue that even though the framework has changed, the 
basis for the agreements has remained the same and the FPAs therefore have failed to address 
any criticism. It is however also recognised that FPAs have been a unique experience in 
relation to trying to reconcile conflicting interests. No other fisheries agreements offer the 
same level of insight and obligations as the FPAs, also making them easy to criticise (CFFA, 
2009).  
 EU is increasingly dependent on external fish supply both to meet its market and 
fishing sector demands. This increased demand both has positive and negative potential for 
the ACP countries. High pressure can lead to overexploited resources, but with a sustainable 
management of the resources the level of benefits accruing the ACP can potentially be high. 
Increased competition from other DWF nations, such as China, Japan, Russia and Korea, has 
made the effects of these potential outcomes even greater (Gorez and Riordan, 2003). In 
countries with no FPA, private arrangements, joint ventures or reflagging of vessels are ways 
to maintain access. The exclusivity clause of the FPAs, requiring all vessels fishing in the 
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given country to be registered under the agreement, has also led to reflagging of EU vessels in 
order to avoid the requirements of the FPA framework.   
 The opinions about the FPAs are many, and as mentioned this is partly a result of the 
relatively transparent nature of the agreements - at least compared to other agreements. The 
fact that the FPAs seek to be more than commercial arr ngements also commits the EU to 
deliver more than just the access fees. While some feel the agreements represent a nicely 
wrapped new-colonial instrument for exploiting the fisheries resources in ACP countries, 
others believe it is the best option for countries unable to fully exploit their own resources. 
Through the current reform process, the agreements are once again being evaluated and 
probably reformed. The 13th of July 2011 the Commission published its proposal for the 
reform in 2012, including a communication on the external dimension of the CFP. The 
changes proposed involve a re-labelling of the agreement to Sustainable Fisheries Agreements 
(SFAs) focusing on resource conservation and enviromental sustainability, improved 
governance and effectiveness of sectoral support. Higher levels of scientific cooperation, 
separation of compensation for access and fisheries support and closer cooperation between 
the EU’s policy areas in order to maintain the coherence of the agreements are some of the 
actions proposed (EC, 2011a). After the Council and Parliament have revised and approved 
this proposal, a new framework for fisheries agreemnts will likely come into place.  
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4.4 The case of Mozambique 
4.4.1 History 
The Republic of Mozambique, colonised by Portugal until 1975 and ravaged by a civil war 
until 1992, is a poor country in monetary terms but rich in resources. Fisheries currently 
contribute to at least 3 percent of the country’s GDP, around 80 000 Mozambicans are 
employed within the fisheries sector and a large number of small fishing communities depend 
of fisheries for subsistence. The artisanal fisheries are the most important in terms of number 
of people employed, while the industrial fisheries especially for shallow-water shrimp 
generate the most export income. Several of the coastal resources are heavily exploited, while 
there is still thought to be a surplus of offshore resources. Mozambique lack the capacity to 
exploit its offshore resources, and this fishery is dominated by foreign operators (MoF, 2009, 
Degnbol et al., 2002).    
 The Republic of Mozambique and the EU have a long asting relationship, in several 
sectors, and three fisheries agreements have been signed between the two parties. The first 
entered into force in 1987, was renewed two times with different protocols and was 
terminated in 1993. The original protocol included rights to fish for shallow water shrimp, 
deep water shrimp and large pelagics for a financial compensation of 2,5 million euro per 
year, while the second protocol increased access rights for tuna vessels and the financial 
compensation correspondingly rose to 3,42 million euro per year. The third protocol however 
only included rights to fish for large pelagics in exchange for a financial compensation of 
275 000 euro per year. The withdrawal of fishing rights to shallow water shrimp came as a 
result of a new fisheries law in 1990 that restricted access to this highly profitable fishery for 
national individuals or companies only; while the uncertain state of the deep water shrimp 
lead to reductions in this fishery also (KusiLimitada, 2008). 
 A second agreement between the two parties did not come into force before 2004. The 
agreement included rights for deep water shrimp and tu a fisheries, and a financial 
contribution of 4,09 million euro per year. The agreement lasted three years, even though 
none of the deep water shrimp opportunities were utilized due to lack of interests from the 
European fishing owners. A license fee of 100 euro was paid per ton caught, of which the 
vessels operators paid 25 euro and the EU 75 euro. The whole financial compensation was 
linked to targeted actions, including monitoring, inst tutional development, research, training, 
quality control and expenses for participating inter ational meetings (Munyuki, 2006). 
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 The financial compensation of this agreement was of a substantial size, and constituted 
a major contribution to the fisheries sector budget. It boosted a lot of fisheries projects and 
gave the sector an economic upturn. However, the fleet did not utilize the deep water shrimp 
opportunities, and they were as a result excluded in the negotiations of a new protocol at the 
end of 2006. Despite of disagreements between the two parties, especially because the 
proposition for a new financial compensation was four times lower than the previous, a new 
agreement came into force the 1th of January 2007 – its content will be presented in section 
4.4.3 (KusiLimitada, 2008). 
4.4.2 Framework 
The framework of the agreement has the same general framework as shown above. 
In addition the FPA is a part of Mozambican fisheries policy and needs to be in line with the 
framework covering this. The main objectives of the fisheries policy in Mozambique are 
guided by the Government’s Fishery Law from 1996 and overall plans including: a Fisheries 
Plan for the period 1994-2004, a newly issued Master Plan for 2010-2018, a Five Year 
Program, an Action Plan for Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA II) and an Action Plan 
for Food Production (PAPA) (MoF, 2009). According to the new master plan, the overarching 
objective for the sector is to increase benefits generated in the fisheries, such as: increased 
contribution to improving food security and nutrition in fish for the population; improve 
living conditions in the small –scale fishing communities; increase the contribution of the 
fisheries to achieving the country’s economic and social development objectives, and increase 
the net sector contribution to greater equilibrium in the country’s balance of payments. This 
will again contribute to the overall objective of the government in Mozambique, which is 
poverty reduction.    
 In addition to the FPA, Mozambique has both development and trade cooperation with 
the EU. Because of EUs policy coherence, this implies that the FPA needs to be in line with 
the Country Strategy Paper for development and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
and the other way around. Mozambique is highly dependent on international assistance, and 
the EU (European Commission and Member States) accounts for approximately 70% of 
development assistance to the country. Through a Country Strategy Paper, the priorities for 
the cooperation between the two parties are set. Th current one is valid from 2008 to 2013 
and presents the focus areas to be: governance, macro-economic support, infrastructure and 
regional integration, food security, rural development and social sectors. While the 
overarching priority is to help Mozambique achieve th  Millennium Development Goals, as 
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well as the country’s action plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy) to decrease the incidence of 
poverty and promote fast, sustainable and broad-based growth. The Strategy Paper is 
accompanied by a National Indicative Program (NIP) that includes the budget and allocation 
of cooperation funds.  The NIP is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF), 
which is the Union’s main instrument for providing aid for development cooperation to ACP 
countries and overseas countries and territories. The EDF is funded by the member states of 
the EU, and is subject to its own financial rules and is managed by a specific committee. The 
current budget for cooperation in Mozambique is 622million euro, of which about half is 
allocated to general budget support and 30 percent to sector budget support, in particular in 
the areas of infrastructures, health, agriculture and rural development. The rest of the portfolio 
is allocated to specific projects, in particular in infrastructures, technical assistance and non-
state actors. In addition 12,1 million euro are set aside for Mozambique’s unforeseen needs 
(EC, 2011e, Goutier, 2010). The EU is also the second major trade partner of Mozambique, 
being its main export partner and the second import artner after South Africa. The trade 
relations between the EU and Mozambique are good and those were reinforced by the 
signature of the interim EPA Agreement in 2009. Theint rim EPA is already being applied 
on the EU side with duty-free/quota-free access to all goods coming from Mozambique. On 
the Mozambican side, liberalization covers 80.5 percent of the goods while the rest – mainly 
agricultural products including dairy products, meat and fish products, wood products, as well 
as some chemicals and minerals – are excluded from liberalization. The agreement still needs 
to be ratified before becoming applicable (EC, 2011f). 
4.4.3 Status 
A FPA, valid from 2007, is the existing framework for European Union’s fishing activity in 
Mozambican waters. It allows 44 freezer tuna seiners and 45 surface long liners fishing rights 
for tuna and other highly migratory species. In retu n the European Union pays a financial 
compensation of 900 000 euro per year based on a reference tonnage of 10 000, plus a license 
fee of 35 € per ton caught paid by the ship owners. If operators fish more than this they have 
to pay an additional fee of 65 euro per ton. The payment shall benefit the fisheries sector and 
be used with full discretion, but the specific amount of 250 000 € per year shall be dedicated 
to the support and implementation of the fishing sector policy drawn up by the Mozambican 
Government. MoF is responsible for managing these funds on the basis of mutual decided 
objectives and in accordance with annual and multiannu l programming. Pre-payments of 
licence fees are made according to vessel types and reference tonnages (COM, 2007).  
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 The agreement is relatively small, at least seen from EUs point of view, but it still is 
an important part in a network of tuna agreements in he region (Informant 1, 2010). 
According to Walmsley et al. (2007a) the EU fleet fish around 70 percent of all tuna catches 
in the Indian Ocean, dominating the purse seine catches with 66 percent while the long line 
catches of the EU only represent 1 percent of the total. For Mozambique the agreement 
represents a major potential both as a source of food and income. But very little information, 
at least publicly available, exists on the real benefits and potential of the FPA (Informant 5 
and 6, 2010). To get a real understanding of the statu  of the agreement, more studies and 
evaluations need to be made or accessed.   
 During the first half of 2011 Mozambique and EU started negotiations on a new 
agreement, and after tough but constructive discussion  the parties agreed on the content of 
the new protocol and annexes in June 2011. Before a new agreement can be signed and 
initiated, the Parliament and Council in the EU need to approve it. Since the agreement from 
2007 is still valid, it will remain the research object of this thesis.  The anticipated changes 
proposed do however include: a division of the financi l payment linked to access and the 
contribution to fisheries support; a reduction of available licenses by 1 purse seiners and 13 
long liners; a reference tonnage reduced to 8000 tons; a financial contribution increased by 
80 000 euro per year and obligation of employment of at least one Mozambican crew on each 
vessel and port inspection (EU/MOF, 2011). 
  
 
5. Properties and attributes of
Through reviewing secondary 
relevant informants, the conceptual interactive governance
organize and puzzle data together with the aim of 
governance process of the FPA between Mozambique and the EU
First, system properties and attributes 
three orders of governance, link
evaluated. In chapter 6 the results will 
basis for a discussion related to the capacities and potential 
ability to achieve given objectives.
5.1 System-to-be-governed
A partly natural and partly social sy
and systems of users and stake
 
Natural system 
The geographical area where the FPA fishery occurs and the resources found there.
Figure 3: The Mozambican fishing zone
 the FPA between EU and Mozambique
and tertiary literature and conducting in depth interviews with 
 framework will be
drawing up a picture describing the 
 as accurate
are presented and their levels assessed
ed to interactions in and between systems will be
be translated into levels of governability and form the
to increase governability and the 
 
 
stem including:  ecosystems, the resources they har
holders who form coalitions and institutions among themselves. 
 
 (constructed by plotting FPA coordinates into Google
38
 
 applied to 
ly as possible. 
. Thereafter, the 








The FPA allows EU vessels access to fish in a restricted fishing zone outside the coast of 
Mozambique, defined by coordinates given in appendix four of the agreement (COM, 2007). 
The area stretches from 12 to 200 nautical miles, but because of a dispute related to the 
French EEZs of Bassas da India and Juan de Nova the area is not constructed like a normal 
EEZ and is rather referred to as the Mozambican fishing zone (KusiLimitada, 2008). The 
vessels are allowed to catch highly migratory species, as listed in Annex 1 of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (COM, 2007). However, as a result of 
Mozambican obligations on Turtle Exclusive Devices (TEDs) in trawl nets from 20032, it is 
prohibited to catch turtles, dugongs and dolphins (I formant 1, 2010; WWF, 2003). 
 
Table 8: Diversity of the natural system 
Property SG: Natural system 
Diversity Main targeted species: 
- Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis)  
- Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares)  
- Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) 
- Albacore (Thunnus alalunga)  
- Swordfish (Xiphias gladius) 
Other species: 
Blue (Makaira nigricans), black (Makaira indica) and striped (Tetrapturus audax) 
marlin and sail fish (Istiophorus platypterus). 
Neritic tuna species: Bullet tuna (Auxis rochei), frigate tuna (Auxis thazard), longtail tuna 
(Thunnus tonggol), narrow-barred Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson), 
Indo-Pacific king mackerel (Scomberomorus guttatus) and Kawakawa (Euthynnis 
affinis). 
By catch: 
Blue shark (Prionace glauca), silky shark (Carcharhinus falciformis), oceanic whitetip 
shark (Carcharhinus longimanus), shortfin mako shark (Isurus oxyrinchus), scalloped 
hammerhead shark (Sphyrna lewini) and other species of sharks and bony fish.  
Marine turtles and seabirds are also affected by the fis eries, and their status is monitored 
(IOTC, 2011c).    
 
                                                  
2 Trawl nets are however rarely used for catching highly migratory species, only some species of neritic tunas, 
and in Mozambique they are mainly used to catch shrimp and prawn species. The prohibition on catching turtles, 
dugongs and dolphins is however also a part of the FPA regulations (Informant 21, 2011 and informant 1, 2010). 
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The coastal waters of Mozambique are part of the South West Indian Ocean, which is known 
to host highly productive ecosystems. But due to reduc d research capacity Mozambique 
currently has limited information both on the compositi n and state of their offshore 
resources. However, because of the highly migratory nature of the targeted species, the 
regional fisheries management organization, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), is 
responsible for collecting information and compiling statistics on tuna and tuna-like species in 
the whole region. In relation to this they also do an effort to understand and identify the 
different parts of the ecosystem these species are a part of, and four different working groups 
are set up to focus on: Billfish, Ecosystems and by catch, Tropical tuna and Data collection 
and statistics (IOTC, 2011c). Mozambique has until recently neither been a member nor 
cooperating party of IOTC. Detailed country information has therefore not been made 
available and official IOTC reports and recommendations have been their only source of 
biological information on their tuna resources (Informant 3, 2010). However, in March 2011 
Mozambique was granted status as a cooperating non-contracting party of IOTC, and will 
from now on extend their capacity to participate in the IOTC processes (IOTC, 2011a). 
 Regional status’ of the main stock were presented a  IOTC’s last Scientific Committee 
(2011c). Skipjack tuna is the most caught species, representing a catch of 440 600 tons in the 
Indian Ocean during 2009. There is a lack of information on the status of the stock, but 
skipjack tuna is regarded to be resilient to over-exploitation due to its high productivity. IOTC 
believes the stock is in a good state, but advices close monitoring. Yellowfin tuna is the 
second most caught species, accounting for 288 100 tons in 2009. In 2010 the Scientific 
Committee considered the stock to be overexploited, or very close to being so. IOTC, as a 
result, recommends that total catches in the Indian Ocean should not increase beyond 300 000 
tons a year. Levels of big eye tuna are uncertain, and IOTC recommends that catches are kept 
at or below 102 000 tons, in order to ensure that te estimated MSY level is not exceeded. For 
Albacore the catches were considered to be within acceptable levels in 2008, but due to 
recovery of data on historical catches in Indonesia (2003-08), new estimates indicated higher 
levels than previously indicated and IOTC has now recommended revisiting the status of the 
stock of albacore as soon as possible. In regards to swordfish effort has declined, and catches 
remain substantially below the estimated MSY of 29 000 tons. IOTC (2011c) does not 
consider restrictive management to be necessary, but highlights the importance of continuous 
monitoring especially in the South-west Indian Ocean where swordfish has been heavily 
targeted since the mid 1990s and may represent a subpop lation or separate stock of this 
species. This is especially important as the species is characterized by late maturity, long life 
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and sexual dimorphism, making it vulnerable to over exploitation. For the other species and 
components of the ecosystem there is an even greater lack of detailed information, and their 
status is thus uncertain.  
 The number of targeted species is relatively low, but lack of information makes it 
difficult to assess the state they are in or the div rsity of the ecosystem they are part of. But 
from what is known the natural system relevant for the FPA is likely to have a medium degree 




According to Potier et al. (2004) epipelagic ecosystems in the tropical open oceans generally 
are oligotrophic, but large predators such as tuna and tuna-like species are abundant and 
ubiquitous with high metabolic rates. Survival of pelagic predators depends on their efficiency 
to locate prey-rich areas, and since these areas often are patchy, they need to migrate over vast 
areas. There is limited detailed information on how tunas and tuna like species in the South 
West Indian Ocean interact with their ecosystem, but existing studies are used to indicate the 
level of complexity. 
  
Table 9: Complexity of the natural system 
Property SG: Natural system 
Complexity Life strategy: 
Mono or multi species schools: free swimming or log associated. 
- Skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and juvenile or small bigeye tunas are often found in 
association with logs/FADs3.  
- Larger yellowfin and adult bigeye mostly are found i  the surface and sub-surface 
waters (Langley et al., 2009). 
- Swordfish generally found above the thermocline (FishBase, 2010b). 
Prey: 
Findings indicate opportunistic feeding patterns for several species, but also signs of 
some specialisation according to species and depth. 
Crustaceans and small fish seem to dominate the prey cat gory, with the mantis shrimp 
(Natosquilla investigatoris) and the swimming crab (Charybdis edwardsi) being of key 
importance. The latter is mainly preyed on in its pelagic phase October to March, during 
which it matures and spawns (Potier et al., 2004). 
 
                                                  
3 Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs): artificial floating objects used to attract pelagic fish which tend to gather 
around them (Govinden, et al.,2010). 
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System productivity: 
Potential system productivity is unknown.  
Estimated catch of large pelagics by foreign fleets in Mozambican waters in 2011:  
6,568 tons (MoF, 2010).  
 
Existing studies indicate that tunas have some prey ferences according to species and size, 
while exhibiting opportunistic feeding behaviour to a greater or lesser extent. Potier et al.’s 
(2004) study on yellowfin and bigeye tunas indicate that considering the importance of the 
biomass of the two species, it is likely that tuna exerts a significant predation pressure on the 
epi and meso pelagic communities. Findings indicate that both surface swimming bigeye and 
yellowfin almost exclusively feed on crustaceans, with the stomatopod Natosquilla 
investigatoris (known as mantis shrimp) highly dominating the category. In addition, 
yellowfin has shown signs of feeding specialization f r fish (scombrids) and bigeye for squid 
(ommastrphids). For deepwater swimming fish of the two species, a mixed pattern was 
observed. Bigeye seemed to have a more generalized feeding behaviour, while the strategy of 
yellowfin was more balanced between fish, crustaceans and cephalopods. These results 
indicate that the difference between the two species is that bigeye is able to prey on fish at 
deeper waters. The swimming crab (Charybdis edwardsi) is also regularly observed as a part 
of the tuna diet. According to Fishbase (2010b) swordfish are opportunistic feeders, known to 
forage for their food from the surface to the bottom ver a wide depth range. They are known 
to feed mainly on fish, but also crustaceans and squid . They use their sword to kill the prey. 
 Species composition of bycatch, i.e. non-targeted species, depends on the equipment 
being employed and the spatial organisation of the isheries. Seabirds, turtles, sharks and 
juvenile sword fish are prominent in the bycatch of long liners, while sharks, turtles and 
juvenile tuna dominate purse seine bycatch. The evolution of FAD fisheries has made the 
challenge of avoiding bycatch greater (Dagorn et al., 2008).    
 Since crustaceans and small-size fish seem to dominate the diet, it is likely that there is 
a short food chain leading to tuna in the Western Indian Ocean. Lack of detailed data makes it 
difficult to accurately assess the complexity of the natural system, but on the basis of what is 








According to FAO (2002) the east coast of Africa is the site of some of the most dynamically 
varying marine ecosystems in the world. The Somali current develops during the south-west 
monsoon to become one of the fastest open ocean currents known, and the upwelling that 
occurs along the coast during the intensified phase of this current creates a major coastal 
upwelling system. In Mozambique this occurs south to about 16º S, resulting in a southward 
coastal current and a north going counter current (Lichucha et al., 2003). Both the upwelling 
system and the currents drive nutrient-rich water to the surface, creating the basis for resource 
productive areas. These and other components affecting the dynamics of the ecosystem are 
summarised in the table below, followed by a more detailed elaboration.  
 
 
Table 10: Dynamics of the natural system 
Property SG: Natural system 
Dynamics Biological and physiological changes over time: 
Long term: 
Monsoon and coastal upwelling, currents, climate variations and presence of logs or 
introduction of FADs.  
Seasonal: 
Winds, rainfall, river run-offs and occurrence of mantis shrimp and swimming crab. 
Affecting conditions for productivity: 
Salinity and oxygen levels, chlorophyll concentration, algae bloom, thermocline depth and 
temperatures. 
 
The climate of Mozambique is according to Lichucha et l. (2003) predominantly tropical 
humid to sub-humid: South of the Zambezi River a passage of the depressions of the South-
Eastern Trade Wind Zone dominates, while the region north of the river is part of the southern 
end of the East African Monsoon system. The coast receives rain all months of the year, with 
a maximum during the southern summer. North of Save Ri r there is a well-defined rainy 
season, while the rainy season is irregular and unpredictable south of the river. Rainfalls give 
lower levels of salinity and oxygen, affecting the conditions of tuna and other species that are 
sensitive to changes in these levels. River run-offs especially from the Zambezi River are also 
important, draining nutritious water into the coastal environment every year. Further, winds 
affect the dynamics in the ecosystem by mixing surface waters and alter temperature and 
thermocline depth depending on how strong and constant the winds are. In the north of 
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Mozambique the winds follow the alternating monsoon system with north eastern winds 
during the southern summer, and south western winds during the southern winter; while the 
central and southern parts of Mozambique receive easterly prevailing winds, and especially 
during the southern summer gales can affect fishing activity (Lichucha et al., 2003).  
 A study conducted by Fraile et al.’s  (2010) shows that the highest Catch per Unit 
Effort4 of both skipjack and yellowfin occurred in areas characterized by high chlorophyll 
concentration and reduced thermocline. Even though there are many biotic and abiotic factors 
influencing the occurrence of tuna, depth and gradient of thermocline together with 
chlorophyll concentration seem to be the most important factors affecting their presence. This 
because tuna often prefers staying between the layer of warm and cold waters, feeding on the 
trophic chain generated by high primary production. There is also significant evidence that 
years with high levels of mantis shrimp and/or swimming crab forming pelagic swarms 
invading the region will generate high recruitment of una (Informant 6, 2010). Cyclonic 
conditions on the other hand are probably not suitable for tuna. 
 The introduction of FADs and development of associated fisheries affect the dynamics 
in the natural system. According to Robert et al. (2010) releasing thousands of FADs in the 
tropical oceans obviously represents a change in the atural habitat of tropical fish and argue 
that some scientists consider that it could lead to changes in the behaviour and biology of 
tuna. There are several hypotheses on why tunas have developed associative behaviour with 
floating objects: it could be a result of an evolutionary process where logs were used as 
indicators on nutritious water, or it could be a behavioural strategy for tuna in poor condition 
to save energy. FAD fisheries benefit from this behaviour and now constitute nearly half of 
the tuna catches worldwide (Fraile et al., 2010).  
 The biological and physical changes affecting the dynamics of the natural system seem 
to be relatively stable over time. However, the occurrence of mantis shrimp and swimming 
crab affect the levels of tuna productivity more than other factors, as do the introduction of 




There is a lack of detailed information on where th tuna species migrate to feed and spawn. 
Since nutritious waters may be patchy, they probably migrate over large areas while feeding.  
                                                  
4 Catch per Unit Effort is a unit applied to standardize catch data by dividing total catch with the total amount of effort 
(i.e. time, area or capacity) used to harvest the catch (OECD,2001). 
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Information on spawning grounds is also insufficient, but  IOTC (2011c) provides details on 
two of the main species: 
 -  Yellowfin tuna spawns from December to March in the equatorial area, the main 
spawning grounds being west of 75º E, and the secondary spawning grounds being off Sri 
Lanka, the Mozambican channel and in the eastern Indian Ocean off Australia. 
 - Skipjack tuna spawns opportunistically when conditions are favourable throughout 
the year in the whole inter-equatorial Indian Ocean.  
  
Table 11: Scale of the natural system 
Properties SG: Natural system 
Scale Geographical scale: 
The target species migrate over large areas in the West Indian Ocean ecosystem, across nation 
borders and coastal systems. Some species are also abundant in local coastal areas.  
Temporal scale: 
Average age: 8-11 years 
Most targeted species minimum population doubling time 1, 4 - 4, 4 years. 
Swordfish 4, 5 – 14 years (Fishbase, 2010a,b,c,d,e). 
 
Concerning temporal scale it is relevant to study age structure and reproduction rate of the 
different species. Numbers provided by FishBase indicate that most species live around 8 to 
11 years. Fishbase (2010a) estimates the minimum population doubling time for skipjack tuna 
to be 1,4 to 4.4 years, and the species to be moderately vulnerable. Skipjack is highly robust 
to overfishing because of its rapid growth, early maturation and high reproductive potential. 
The population doubling time of yellowfin is the same as the previous one, but it is 
moderately resilient and moderately to very vulnerable (Fishbase, 2010d). The minimum 
population doubling time of bigeye and albacore are similar to the two previous species. But 
because of their high market value the species are given a high to very high vulnerability 
status (Fishbase, 2010c:e). Swordfish has a minimum population doubling time of 4, 5 – 14 
years, and is because of this, less resilient than t e mentioned tuna species. In addition it has a 
high market value, making it very vulnerable (FishBase, 2010b). 
 The highly migratory nature of the targeted species indicates that the natural system is 
of a large geographical size, enclosing local, natio l and regional areas. Most species, with 
the exception of swordfish, reproduce over a relatively short period of time and have a 
resilient biological nature, but some species are more vulnerable to overexploitation due to 
their high market values. With all these factors taken into consideration, the scale issue is 
assessed to be medium to high level. 
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The socio-economic system linked to the FPA includes a wide range of actors having an 
interest in the agreement, directly or potentially. These are presented in the table below, 
followed by a more detailed elaboration on the most important stakeholders.   
  
Table 12: Diversity of the socio-economic system 
 
The vessel operators make their living directly from the fisheries, and naturally have a great 
interest vested in the FPA. A small quantity of tuna is caught by semi-industrial and artisanal 
fishermen, but even though the potential for these fleets to catch larger quantities needs to be 
explored, Mozambique lack capacity to exploit their own offshore resources and foreign fleets 













FPA fleet (licensed vessels 2010): 
Purse seiners (PS): 21  
Surface long liners (LL): 16 + ANABAC (5), AGAC (3) and Orthongel (4)  
(Informant 2 and 14, 2011). 
Crew: European and ACP (Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.). 
European DWF communities: Spain (Basque country, Galicia and Asturias) and France (Brittany 
and La Réunion) (EC, 2009). 
Industry: 
Producers (mainly canneries) in Europe: Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. 
Canneries in Seychelles (Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd.) and Madagascar (Pêche et Froid Ocean Indien) 
Consumers: 
FPA-caught fish mainly supply European markets (Spain, France, Italy, UK and Germany), as 
well as the North American market (Informant 24, 2011; OceanicDeveloppement, 2005). 
Mozambique: 
MoF: financial compensation 
Fisheries sector: funds potentially can contribute to domestic development, employment, food 
security and so on for the Mozambican people.  
Mozambican Semi-industrial and artisanal vessels occasionally catch some tuna. 
Others: 
Non-EU fleets licensed in the tuna fisheries:  
12 Japanese, 2 Spanish, 3 Korean and 4 Chinese Joint Venture long liners (Informant 14, 2010). 
Politicians and potential investors. 
Neighbouring countries in the region: management cooperation and trade. 
Pirates: Somali or others making profits from the tuna fisheries 
Future generations. 
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dominate the fisheries. The agreement allows 44 freezer tuna seiners and 45 surface long 
liners access to the FPA fisheries. But in 2010, as shown in the table above, only 21 seiners 
and 35 long liners were licensed. The reasons why not all licenses are utilized is not known, 
but piracy is thought to be one of them. The long li ers are mainly Spanish and Portuguese, 
while the purse seiners are Spanish and French (Informant 1 and 2, 2010).  
 In chapter five of the agreement it is stated thatat least 20 percent of the crew 
employed shall be of ACP origin and of these at least 40 percent shall be Mozambican if 
possible (COM, 2007). Detailed information about the crew fishing onboard the FPA vessels 
in Mozambique is not available, but according to a report prepared by the European 
Commission (2009) crew on tuna vessels are mainly of Spanish (Basque country, Galicia and 
Asturias) and French (Brittany and La Réunion) origin n addition to fishermen from ACP 
countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and so on). Since crew members 
often are recruited from the same areas, DWF represnt an important source of employment in 
certain communities.   
 The majority of the fish caught by EU vessels in the West Indian Ocean is frozen 
onboard and shipped off to Europe for further processing. The distance and extent of the 
Indian Ocean necessitate the use of local ports for re uelling and other requirements 
(transhipping, provisioning and maintenance), and the vessels fishing in Mozambican waters 
often use Port Victoria in the Seychelles. The vessels licensed under ANABAC, OPAGAC 
and Orthongel are foreign vessels, most often which are from the Seychelles, owned investors 
from the EU. While some of these vessels (at least those licensed under OPAGAC) are owned 
by companies with their own processing plants, the majority of fish is sold to different 
producers through agreements and auctions. A lot of fish is shipped back to Europe to supply 
the tuna industries especially in Spain and France, but some is also landed in the Seychelles or 
on Madagascar and supply local canneries there. Small tun s (skipjack, yellowfin and 
albacore) caught by purse seiners are mostly canned. While larger line caught tunas are used 
to produce higher quality products, e.g. sashimi, or sold for direct consumption.    
(OceanicDeveloppement, 2005).  
 Mozambique is dependent on foreign fleets to generate any revenue from their 
offshore resources, but only receives a small share of the potential value from the resources as 
neither EU nor the other operators bring any value creation to Mozambique other than paying 
for access. The whole financial compensation paid by the EU is to benefit the fisheries sector, 
while access fees by other operators are shared equally between the state budget and the 
fisheries sector budget. MoF naturally has a great interest in maximizing the financial 
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contribution, while optimising the benefits created from it. Fish is an important source for 
food, employment and income, and Mozambique is a poor c untry in need of all three things. 
The people of Mozambique thus have a great interest in the tuna resources and the potential 
benefits they can give. Even though the agreement contains provisions encouraging landings, 
production and employment in the third country, this as not been the case so far (Informant 7 
and 8, 2010; Eide, 2004). 
 The socio-economic system linked to the FPA includes a wide range of actors and 
stakeholders both in Europe, Mozambique and other countries in the South West Indian 




Stakeholders and interests are many and conflicting, some being more powerful and 
advocated louder than others.   
 
Table 13: Complexity of the socio-economic system 
Property SG: Socio-economic system 
Complexity Main interests: 
Through the FPA the DWF aims to maintain access and the European Industry seeks 
supplies at a minimum cost. Mozambican stakeholders s ek to maximise revenue and 
other potential benefits. Sustainable exploitation is i  all parties’ interest.    
Fishing field: 
No direct conflict between the Mozambicans and the EU fleet.  
Long liners and Purse seiners normally operate in different areas. 
EU fleets competing with Asian DWF fleets. 
Piracy involves physical attacks and creates a security threat.   
IUU levels are unknown, leading to speculations on its extent.  
Stakeholder organisation: 
Fleet and industry: 
- Foreign EU owned vessels are represented by ANABAC, OPAGAC (Spain) and 
Orthongel (France). 
- Cepesca represent all Spanish ship owners 
- Spanish tuna canners are organised in Anfaco-Cecopes a, French canner in FIAC.  
- The interests of all of the above are represented by EUROTHON, based in Brussels. 
  In addition all national shipowners are represented by EUROPECHE. 
(Informant 22 and 24, 2011). 
Mozambican stakeholders: 
- Fisheries sector and people’s interests voiced by the Ministry of Fisheries (MoF). 
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Because of limited MCS capacity it is difficult to know exactly what is happening offshore 
and to what extent fleets comply with regulations. The fleets operate under the cover of 
distance, speculations arise and the fleets are accused of IUU fishing. One of the main 
challenges these days is that Somali piracy has increased along the coast of East Africa in the 
recent years. Vessels are high jacked, catch is being stolen and security of the crew is being 
jeopardized (Informant 6, 2010).     
 There are clear conflicts between the interests of he stakeholders. The EU fleet and 
industry seek to maximize exploitation, while minimizing the financial compensation. 
Competition with other DWFs affects their operations, and they will seek a level playing field 
where all fleets have to follow the same regulations. The focus of Mozambican stakeholders 
will be to maximize revenue at a minimal level of exploitation (CFFA, 2006). 
 A complex range of stakeholders constitute the socio-e onomic system linked to the 
FPA, some of them being more organised and powerful than others. The most active and 
benefiting stakeholders are found in the EU fleet, industry and market, while the Mozambican 
stakeholders are less visible and only receive a small share of potential benefits through 
fisheries projects funded by EU money. Somali piracy currently increases the level of 




Changes in stakeholder composition, values and attitudes over time are presented in the table 
below, followed by a more detailed explanation on their drivers and consequences.  
 
Table 14: Inherent dynamics of the socio-economic system 
Property SG: Socio-economic system 
Dynamics Composition of operators has been the same during the last years: 
Vessels from Spain (LL and PS), France (PS) and Portugal (LL) dominate the EU fleet. 
Only EU vessels in the purse seine fisheries, while t e EU and Asian fleets are equally 
active in the long line fisheries. Recently a couple of new Joint Ventures have joined 
(Informant 1, 2010). 
 
Somali piracy has lead to changed patterns of fishing: vessels not fishing in all areas. 
Boats fishing together, security guards onboard and increased costs (Informant 3, 2010).  
 
Mozambicans stakeholders lack resources to realize their potential share of the resources, and 
even though a few joint ventures have been set up between Mozambique and Spain, China 
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and Korea, the fleet is dominated by foreigners. Due to lack of financial capacity there has 
neither been any development of boats nor production facilities in Mozambique, and the 
Mozambican stakeholders only receive a part of the rent extracted. There is however 
indications on increased presence of Asian operators, as both Japanese and Chinese investors 
have shown interest in Mozambique (Informant 2, 2010). 
 Somali piracy has lead to severe changes in the patt rns of fishing in the West Indian 
Ocean. The Mozambican Channel has been regarded as a relative safe area, but attacks are 
increasing. Fleets as a consequence avoid certain aeas nd take security considerations 
involving guards onboard and fishing two and two vessels together. The ability to explore 
large areas and track free swimming schools have been reduced, increasing the fisheries for 
log associated schools. This might affect the expected yield per recruit as well as bycatch 
levels. Some vessels have also moved to other oceans (IOTC, 2011c). 
 Dynamics of the socio-economic system generally seem to be relatively low, seen as 
financial capacity hinders Mozambican stakeholders to become more involved and the 
composition of active stakeholders have been relativ ly stable over recent years. In addition to 
the EU operators, Asian operators have increased the competition for the offshore resource. In 
addition piracy and IUU fishing bring insecurity into the sector, affecting fishing and 
estimates on resource pressure. Taking this into acc unt, dynamics are likely to be at a 




The processes of globalisation have increased the connections between actors around the 
world, increasing the size and range of the socio-eonomic system. The FPA include 
stakeholders in Mozambique, Europe and in the ACP region. The boundaries and importance 
of the FPA is presented below.  
   
Table 15: Scale of socio-economic system 
Property SG: Socio-economic system 
Scale Mozambican stakeholders include state, fisheries sector and population.  
Fleet, industry and market: International, regional and local levels, in Spain, France and 
Portugal as well as in ACP countries.  
- Employees  in the fleet: 390 (based on the reference tonnage) (KusiLimitada, 2008). 
- Direct and indirect value of the FPA operations: 
 2,4 million (EU: 1,7; Mozambique: 0,3 and other thi d countries: 0,4). 
- Production and marketing: 0,5 million (EU: 0,4; Mozambique 0 and other third 
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countries 0,2). Other third countries include Seychlles and Madagascar (canneries) and 
crew from ACP countries (EC, 2009). 
 
It is evident that the scale issue related to the socio-economic system is high. The fleet 
involves crew from many countries; the fish is often shipped from one part of the world to 
another for production and thereafter sent to international markets. The high level of 
globalisation linked to the FPA fisheries involves both a positive and negative potential for 
the lower levels, communities and population. The numbers related to direct and indirect 
value of the FPA operations do however show that the organisation of the value chain 
channels most of the value to the EU, leaving only a small share for Mozambique and other 
third countries in the region (EC, 2009). When governing the FPAs, it is highly important to 
assess the scale issue, and what benefits and challenges are related to each of them.    
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5.2 Governing system 
Social, man-made system of institutions, steering instruments and mechanisms.  
 
 









The Governing system of the FPA comprises a range of d partments, directorates and 
institutes both in the EU, Mozambique and the West Indian Ocean, some being directly 
involved in the governing process while others play less prominent parts. These units and 
their main responsibilities are presented below.  
 
Table 16: Diversity of the Governing System 
Properties GS 
Diversity Mozambique: 
- Department of International Cooperation (DCI): political relations 
- Department of administration and finances (DNEP) 
- Department for Aquaculture  
- National Directorate of Fisheries Administration (ADNAP):  
  technical management (licensing, MCS) 
- National Directorate of Fisheries Economics and Policies (DNEP):  
   responsible for budget and policy making 
- National Directorate of Human Resources 
- National Institute of Fisheries Research (IIP): collect resource data 
- Fisheries Development Fund (FFP): accounting  
- Institute for Small-scale fisheries development (IDPPE) 
- Fisheries School (EP) (Omar, 2006). 
 
EU: 
- European Commission: negotiations and governance.  
   DG Mare – Unit of Bilateral Agreements and Fisheries Control in International Waters  
  Advisory committees: Regional or by topic; including NGOs, industry, scientists and    
  other stakeholders or experts. 
  Inter services Consultations: Including relevant DGs. 
- External Action Services: secure coherence and efficiency. 
- Parliament: co-decision authority and approval 
   Issues prepared and presented by the Fisheries Committee   
- Council of Ministers: legislative authority (Informant 15, 2010;  Bomberg et al., 2008). 
 
Regional organisations:  
- IOTC: Responsible for managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the 
Indian Ocean. EU a member and Mozambique a cooperating non-contracting party.   
- Other : UN (FAO), IOC, SWIOC, SADC, OECD (EBCD, 2010) 
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The Ministry of Fisheries (MoF) is through the Fishery Law from 1990 legally responsible for 
management and development of marine resources in Mozambique (Omar, 2006). The 
structural composition of MoF, as we know it today, was however only officially created by 
Presidential decree in 2000. Many of the institutions existed in different forms before this, but 
time was needed to establish a structure adjusted to a new and independent Mozambique. 
Today, as presented in the table above, three departments, three directorates, four semi-
autonomous institutes, a fisheries school and provincial directorates and services constitute 
the MoF (Lichucha et al., 2003, Degnbol et al., 2002). Not all of these are directly involved in 
governing the FPA, but they are however part of general discussions and consultations in the 
Ministry regarding initiation of new agreements or execution of funds. DNEP is responsible 
for developing matrices for how funds are spent and how this relates to overall governance 
objectives. Before funds can be executed, they needto be approved both by the Parliament 
and the Ministry of Finances. FFP is responsible for accountants in relation to the actual 
execution of FPA funds, securing that funds are applied for the agreed projects and so on 
(Informant 8, 2010). 
 As a result of the CFP from 1983, a large part of the governance responsibilities in the 
EU is centralised, and in relation to FPAs, almost all asks lie within the main institutions in 
Brussels. The European Commission is responsible for foll wing up and negotiating 
agreements, and tasks are executed by representativs within DG MARE5 – generally found 
working under the Unit for Bilateral Agreements and Fisheries Control in International 
Waters. It is the responsibility of the Commission t  collect information from stakeholders, 
normally done through working groups of experts participating in Advisory Committees and 
Regional Advisory Councils consult, and through the governance process trying to represent 
and reconcile the different interests in an optimal w y. Through inter services consultations 
other General Directorates (DGs) are consulted, the most important being DG Development 
and Cooperation - EuropeAid and DG TRADE. The first DG generally assesses and makes 
comments on how agreements relate to the Union’s development policy. Due to the European 
Consensus on Coherence for Development from 2000 all policy areas of the Union need to be 
coherent with the overarching development policies. DG Trade investigates how agreements 
relate to trade issues. If an agreement is to be (re-) initialled, only the Commission has the 
right to propose this for the Council. The Council discusses the proposal at three levels: 
working groups at civil servant-level, Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) 
                                                  
5 DG MARE is short for Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (EC,2011b). 
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and in the Council of Ministers. If agreement is reached at the lower levels, final decisions on 
proposals are made in the Council by voting. The Parliament also needs to approve the 
proposal, and after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 their powers are extended 
through the co-decision procedure, as they gained law-making powers. The fisheries 
committee is responsible for elaborating and presenting fisheries issues for the Parliaments 
general assembly. Another result of the Lisbon Treaty was the foundation of European 
External Action Services (EEAS), which are to assist the EU’s newly appointed high 
representative for foreign affairs and security policy. The aim of EEAS is to increase the 
impact and coherence of EU’s foreign policy (Borchardt, 2010). 
 The IOTC is an intergovernmental organization established in 1996 under the auspices 
of FAO. The RFMO is responsible for managing the highly migratory resources in the Indian 
Ocean and adjacent seas (FAO statistical areas 51 and 57), and has its headquarters in the 
Seychelles. Representatives of governments of the coastal states in the area as well as states 
fishing there take part in regional cooperation on preparing assessments of the resources and 
formulate resolutions on how to manage them. In addition, organisations such as the Indian 
Ocean Commission (IOC) and South Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission 
(SWIOFC) are potentially important in relation to regional cooperation on fisheries 
management (WWF, 2005b). These organisations do not have management mandates, but are 
nonetheless important in guiding their members towards common policy directions. In 2002 
Mozambique also ratified the SADC Fisheries Protocol, a legal framework aiming to guide 
fisheries managers in SADC countries in the same direction, especially in relation to what 
concerns deeper regional integration, poverty reduction and achieving the MDGs (SADC, 
2010). In addition, both the EU and Mozambique are members of UNCLOS, FAO and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and are jointly committed 
to follow the regulations and advice given by these organisations.    
 With the number of units and responsibilities part of the Governing System, diversity 
must be assessed to be high.  
    
Complexity 
 
A governing system including a high number of sub-units is likely to involve complex 
positions, views and goals. The different objectives of the GS units involved in the 
governance of the FPA are elaborated on in the following.  
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Table 17: Complexity of the governing system 
Property GS 
Complexity Mozambique: 
The departments and institutes constituting the MoF generally have the same goals 
regarding the FPA: Collect as much resource rent as pos ible, without compromising the 
sustainability of the resources. Even though the units responsible for scientific and 
technical management of the resources tend to have a gr ater focus on biological concerns 
than the units responsible for economic affairs, the Mozambican governing units 
generally have the same overarching goals and co-operate on achieving these.   
 
EU:  
- Commission: aims to reconcile all stakeholder interests, i.e.: industry, environment, aid 
and other interests advocated through the Advisory C mmittee for Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, the Regional Advisory Council for Long Distance fishing or other forms of 
consultations. Secure access and supply the EU industry, while at the same time 
promoting development in the third country. Minimise costs, maximise exploitation. 
- Parliament: is the voice of the people and aims will depend upon the members’ political 
positions. Decisions are made by voting. 
- Council: Fisheries ministers, permanent representatives (COREPER) and working 
groups aim to secure national interests, and protecting the industry is often a high priority 
for socio-economic reasons.  
 
Constant power struggle within and between governing u its: 




The mandates and provisions of regional organisations are sometime unclear, and since 
they mainly are based on voluntary cooperation compliance is a challenge.  
 
In the governance process within the EU, the aim is to take in as many interests as possible, 
making the governing units highly complex. The Commission seeks to reflect the 
complexities as best as possible. The Parliament is composed by political parties with 
different priorities and goals, and when proposals are to be approved, these interests will 
decide the outcome of voting. The Council of Minister  represents different countries, some 
focusing on the economic importance of the industry while others emphasize environmental 
conservation. Generally countries in the south of Europe with interests in the FPAs, like 
Spain, France and Portugal, vote for the agreements, while northern countries like Sweden, 
Denmark and the UK are more critical (Gorez and Riordan, 2003). Industrial interests are 
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generally very strong within the EU, but the Union’s responsibilities in relation to the 
environment, justice, development and poverty reduction are increasingly being advocated 
especially as a result of the obligations of the European Consensus on Policy Coherence for 
Development from 2005, the enhanced involvement of the Parliament (where especially the 
Greens follow the FPAs with critical eyes) and the introduction of regional advisory councils 
in 2004 (giving a wider range of stakeholders the opportunity to influence policy 
development). Goals and interests are often colliding, as when commitments on cooperation 
and development support are confronted with commercial interests related to the FPAs. The 
outcome is a result of a political process and power struggle between units and actors (CFFA, 
2006).  
 The objective of the IOTC is to promote cooperation among its members with a view 
to ensure appropriate management, conservation and optimum utilization of tuna and tuna like 
species and encourage sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks. To achieve 
this, the Commission has the following functions and responsibilities: gather and analyse the 
situation of the stocks; encourage, recommend, and coordinate research and development 
activities in respect of the stock and fisheries; adopt conservation and management measures, 
on the basis of scientific evidence, in order to ensure conservation of the stocks and promote 
optimum utilization throughout the area; and keep under review the economic and social 
aspects  of the fisheries based on the stocks bearing in mind the interests of developing coastal 
states (IOTC, 2011a). The lack of data and enforcement of requirements challenge these 
activities, and it is a complex task to make the IOTC function in an optimal way. 
 The number of governing units constituting the MoF may also increase the level of 
complexity related to the governing task, and coordination is vital to attain the desired level of 
performance. Lack of evaluations of performance and strategies may however lead to 
misinterpretations related to the actual level of complexity involved and affect the use of the 
capacities of the GS. In the case of governing the FPA between the EU and Mozambique 






The dynamics of the GS indicate how stable the system is, how flexible it is in its functions 
and how well the system can adjust to changes related to the system-to-be-governed.  
  
 
Table 18: Dynamics of the Governing System 
Property GS 
Dynamics Mozambique: 
Bureaucratic structure of the GS, seeking to be participatory. 
Political powers seem to affect technical decisions.  
Recent changes to the GS: 
- ADNAP became autonomous in 2010, and gained a more independent voice within the GS 
- Mozambique became a cooperating non-contracting party of the IOTC in 2011 
 EU: 
The large and bureaucratic size of the EU’s GS, challenge its dynamic. 
The Lisbon treaty altered the structure of the GS within the EU, affecting the procedures 
related to FPAs: 
- Parliament got a more prominent role through the co-decision procedure. 
- Possibility to introduce Qualified Majority voting within the Council (member state votes 
weighed)   
- European External Action Services established to ensure coherent external policies. 
- DG Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid new structure, uniting the previous DG    
   DEV and DG Aid. 
   Field research units and executing units work more closely,while geographical units       
  moved to new services.   
  Goal to work more constructive and effective (Informant 13, 2011). 
IOTC: 
The quantities of data and coordination of members affect the dynamics of the organization. 
The lack of data makes it challenging to develop effective and dynamic management 
measures (Informant 23, 2011).  
 
The table above shows how the governing structures both in Mozambique, the EU and on 
regional basis have relatively bureaucratic structures affecting their dynamics.  
 The structure of the MoF appears to have been relativ ly stable over the recent years, 
with well established mandates and procedures. The syst m does however seem to be 
relatively bureaucratic, and lack of capacity to collect information and make evaluations 
reduces the ability to make efficient and solid founded decisions. Lack of qualified personnel 
also seems to make the system slightly person-dominated, but there are evidently 
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improvements in this area with more replacements being done in the head staff than 
previously. With ADNAP becoming more autonomous, the fisheries technicians gain a more 
independent voice opposed to the politicians and bureaucrats in the GS (Informant 2 and 7, 
2010). 
 The EU is constantly trying to find the best compositi n of GS, and the aim is to 
develop a dynamic system able to respond efficiently. The dynamics of the main governing 
units, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council is affected by how the interests within 
them manage to affect decision making. Industrial interests are strong within all three units 
and the level of conflict between these and obligations in relation to conservation and 
development affect the dynamics of the EU’s governance process. The Lisbon treaty altered 
some of the existing structures and procedures, aiming to create more efficient and dynamic 
decision making processes, and many actors are now trying to navigate in this new terrain 
where power is distributed between the units to a higher degree than previously (Informant 
15, 2011).  
 The dynamics of the IOTC is affected by their lack of verified data in order to 
implement measures for governing the natural resources. The dependency on cooperation 
from a high number of members and non-contracting cooperating parties in order to 
implement resolutions challenges the organisation’s ability to act efficiently (Informant 23, 
2011).   
 The GS is governing a relatively dynamic SG, and the dynamics of the GS itself will 
therefore highly affect its ability to do this. The Mozambican system may seem to be a bit 
slow-reacting due to reduced financial and governance capacities, while the bureaucratic 
nature of the EU system requires time to move forwards. The level of dynamics of the IOTC 
is affected by the dependency on voluntary cooperation, compliance with resolutions and 
reporting of data. Changes are also continuously being made within the GS, some accelerated 
faster and having greater consequences than others. In conclusion, the GS is likely to have a 




Scale of the units within the GS is essential in order to match the boundaries of the SG. 
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Table 19: Scale of the Governing System 
Property GS 
Scale Mozambique: 
MoF institutions centralised, while provincial directorates are involved in general 
discussions. Mainly national, but also regional andlocal interests advocated (Informant 8, 
2010).   
EU: 
Commission: reflects stakeholder interests, experts and the obligations set in the treaties 
Council: Member states interests 
Parliament: political interests. Some focusing on internal interests, while others are also pre-
occupied with third country interests.  
Regional:   
IOTC: involves coastal states in the Indian Ocean and countries fishing there.   
- Other regional organizations like IOC, SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Commission) and SADC are not involved specifically in governing tuna, but cooperation on 
other issues (such as IUU, trade and ecosystems) can be important.  
- International organizations such as UN, FAO (the most relevant UN org.) and OECD are 
important fora to discuss and decide on internationl standards related to FPA issues (EBCD, 
2010)  
 
While the Mozambican governing institutions concentrate on their national interests, 
including local and provincial, as well as regional commitments, the EU institutions cover the 
interests of the member countries, stakeholders– and political interests within different 
coalitions as well as ACP interests.  
  IOTC covers the whole area where highly migratory stocks are found, and coordinates 
the management of these stocks for all countries in the Indian Ocean. IOC, SWIOFC and 
SADC are not directly involved in governing the highly migratory species, but through these 
organizations issues affecting the FPA fisheries can be discussed (Informant 23, 2011).  
 The UN is the main international institution responsible for governing international 
fisheries. Through UNCLOS and the UN Fish stock agreement requirements and provisions 
related to bilateral fisheries agreements are given, and since both Mozambique and the EU are 
members, these need to be fulfilled. In addition, the two have signed the FAO’s Code of 
Conduct and are member of IOTC, and the principles and recommendations advocated by 
them need to be taken into account (EBCD, 2010).   
 The units of the GS cover national, regional and international levels and the scale issue 
is therefore suggested to be high. 
 
 62
5.3 Governing interactions 
 
Image 5: European Parliament, Brussels 
    
 
Image 6: Local council in a Mozambican fishing community  
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Participation 
The existing forms of interactions between the GS and the SG, as well as who are represented, 
are presented in the following. 
  
Table 20: Participation within Governing Interactions 
Attribute  GI 
Participation Technical interactions: 
EU approves vessels for the FPA fisheries, and ADNAP grant licences.  
Fleet report VMS data, entry-exit information and catch numbers to ADNAP, IIP, flag 
state and IOTC. 
Catch verification by flag states’ scientific institu ons (Spain: Instituto Español de 
Oceanografia; France: Institut de Recherche pour le Développement; Portugal: Instituto de 
Investigacão das Pescas e do Mar) and IIP (COM, 2007). 
IOTC: 
EU is a member.  
Mozambique recently became a co-operating party and will now participate in meetings 
They attended their first meeting with two representatives from ADNAP (IOTC, 2011a). 
Joint Committee meeting: 
(Forum for direct governance decisions and negotiati ns) 
ADNAP, DNEP, DCI, IIP, IOTC 
When in Brussels: Mozambican embassy representatives  
EU Commission: DG MARE representatives (one regional EU representative).  
Member states representatives  
Scientific Meeting: 
In addition to most of the same as above: 
Fisheries Development Fund (FFP) (Informant 1and 9, 2010). 
 
Technical interactions mainly involve, as shown above, ADNAP, the Commission, the fleet 
and scientific institutions. The flag state of the vessel is responsible for verifying catches 
through scientific institutes. In the original text of the FPA, IIP was included in this process, 
but in the translated English version of the agreemnt it was not included and was therefore 
not involved before this was noticed. 
 Stakeholders and governing units of the two parties first carry out discussions and 
consultations amongst themselves, before selected representatives from the two meet in 
Maputo or Brussels. First a scientific meeting is set up to discuss technical matters, and 
directors of the most important governing units as well as technicians are represented. 
Through this meeting, as well as through e-mail, an agenda for the Joint Committee meeting 
is developed. This is the main forum for governance discussions, negotiations and decisions 
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related to the FPA, and are according to the agreement supposed to be held once a year. This 
has not been the case during the current agreement. The Mozambican delegation normally 
includes directors of the main institutions and senior consultants, as well as embassy 
representatives when in Brussels. Reduced financial me ns can potentially reduce the number 
of Mozambicans travelling to Brussels. The greatest share of the EU delegation consists of 
representatives from DG MARE’s unit for Bilateral Agreements and Fisheries Control in 
International Waters, specialised on FPA matters. There is also one fisheries representative 
from the EU Delegation in Maputo and one regional EU representative. In addition, member 
states are represented, seen as an extension of the Council’s working group. All member 
states are allowed to participate, but normally only the ones having vessels fishing under the 
FPA are represented (SSNC, 2009). 
 Through IOTC meetings and working parties, stakeholders collaborate on managing 
highly migratory species in the Indian Ocean. A wide range of coastal states in the Indian 
Ocean, as well as states fishing there, are members. There are not any representatives from the 
IOTC Secretariat participating directly in the process of governing the FPA, but as the IOTC 
resolutions are meant to be implemented at a national level, the countries governing and 
negotiating FPAs should have the resolutions in mind as they interact (Informant 21, 2011).    
 Not all stakeholders participate in the governing interactions, and especially the people 
of Mozambique – present and future generations – are dependent on the voice of others to 
advocate their interests. Due to the specific nature of FPAs, only specialists on the agreements 
are directly involved in governing interactions and there is a low level of knowledge about the 
governance process both within the overall governing systems and among the general public. 




How well representatives communicate and cooperate through governing interactions will 
affect the overall governance performance. The different forms of communication applied 
through interactions are presented below. 
 
Table 21: Communication within Governing Interactions 
Attribute GI 
Communication Technical interactions: 
Data and information is communicated between the parties by using the internet, fax and 
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post. VMS involves information being transmitted by satellite (Informant 2, 2010). 
IOTC: 
Through working parties, scientific meetings and an an ual session, the members and 
cooperating parties meet for discussions (Informant 21, 2011).   
Governance interactions 
Views and agendas are discussed by e-mail and telephon , before representatives from 
the two parties meet. 
The EU Delegation in Mozambique is of key importance in regards to communication 
between the two parties. 
Experts within the EC make  ex-ante and ex-post assessments before and after initiating 
agreements, in order to prepare negotiations and governing interactions. These are not 
shared. Open dialogue through the meetings (Informant 1, 2 and 6, 2010). 
 
According to the FPA all fishing vessels with an overall length exceeding 15 metres operating 
in the Mozambican fishing zone shall be equipped with a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
transmitting data on position, course and speed by satellite to control centres on shore. This 
data should ideally be complemented by observer data (COM, 2007). Communication of a 
technical matter has however been challenging becaus  of both problems with internet 
connections and setting up the VMS protocol in Mozambique, reducing the level of technical 
communication. But according to ADNAP (Informant 2 and 3, 2010) the VMS is now up and 
running and they are able to receive data from the EU vessels.  
 Reports on entry-exit times and catch validations shall also be communicated to 
ADNAP. Catches are first validated by scientific research institutes in the flag states. Since 
2002 data from European fleets have been collected within the framework of the EU “Data 
collection regulation”, followed in 2008 by the “Community framework for the collection, 
management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding 
the Common Fisheries Policy (Chassot et al., 2010). The EU Delegation in Mozambique has a 
very important role in the communication between the two parties. All license schemes are 
passed through the Delegation, and when there have been problems with the VMS and other 
reporting mechanisms the Delegation has been responsible for communicating great quantities 
of data to the Mozambican GS.   
 The IOTC receives data from the flag states in aggre ated form, including data from 
purse seiners reported within 1º by 1º squares and long liners within 5º to 5º squares. Due to 
this format of reporting data, the IOTC does not have specific data on how much is being 
caught in the Mozambican Fishing zone. But rather assesses the state of the stocks and level 
of exploitations in the region (Informant 21, 2011).      
 66
 The EU has since 2003 been legally obliged to assess impacts on sustainable 
development through undertaking impact assessments of all policies, including FPAs, both 
before (ex-ante) and after (ex-post) agreements are concluded (CFFA, 2005). These are 
however not shared openly with the partner country. Communication through governance 
interactions is according to representatives from the two parties (Informant 1, 2, 9, 10 and 18) 
constructive and friendly, even though conflicting terests lead to intense discussions. The 
parties do however not attain the same levels of inf rmation, seen as information on actual 
and potential benefits are calculated by the EU while Mozambique neither has the resources 
to conduct such assessments nor the opportunity to access the ones prepared by the EU. This, 
together with the fact that the EU delegation is specialised in FPA-matters while the 
Mozambican representatives only focus on the agreement a small portion of their time may 
affect the quality of communication. Communication between the parties involved in 




The level of adaptation within the governing interactions will determine the governing 
systems ability to interact with the system-to-be-governed in an efficient and effective 
manner.   
 
Table 22: Adaptation within Governing Interactions 
Attribute GI 
Adaptation Technical interactions: 
Reduced MCS capacity reduces the ability to continuously investigate the level of 
compliance and adjust technical interactions thereafter (Informant 3, 2010). 
Biological interactions: 
Difficult for the IOTC to develop management measure , due to the lack verified data 
giving a basis for evaluating the actual state of the stocks (Informant 21 and 23, 2011). 
Governance interactions  
Increasingly higher demands related to governing interactions, e.g. partnership, 
transparency, coherence and so on.  Interactions are facilitated in a manner trying to adapt 
to these new demands and challenges. 
Lack of information, resources and capacity reduces Mozambican ability for adaptive 
interactions. In addition the bureaucratic structure of the GS in both EU and Mozambique 
reduces flexibility of representatives through interactions (Informant 6, 2010).  
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Even though the structure and format of governing interactions has changed in order to adapt 
to new demands over the recent years, adjusting interactions in practical terms remain a 
challenge. Lack of resources and capacities in the Mozambican GS reduces their ability to 
respond quickly and effectively when there is a lack of compliance with regulations. In 
addition, the bureaucratic structures of both the Mozambican and European GS reduces their 
flexibility through governance interactions, especially as the EU represents a wide range of 
interests that are difficult to reconcile.    
 Due to the lack of biological data and ability to implement instruments to govern the 
offshore fisheries, governance of the resources is not very adjustable. IOTC set a limitation on 
fishing capacity in 2003, but even though there have been signs of high exploitation of some 
species, no other management measures to adjust the levels of fishing effort have been 
introduced (Informant 21, 2011). The scientific meeting set up for governing the FPA does 
however need to take the state of the resources into consideration, and the FPA includes a 
clause which allows the fishing opportunities to be revised in the light of scientific evidence 
(COM, 2007). The financial contribution will be increased or reduced proportionally, 
according to Walmsley et al. (2007a) there has however  been few examples of reduction of 
fishing opportunities.   
 The framework for governing the FPAs seeks to establi h more adaptive forms for 
interactions, but the practical realization is challenging and the level of adaptation is therefore 




Many of the interactions, of technical, biological and political nature, involve actors at many 
scales and how well these collaborate will be vital for their final outcome.     
 
Table 23: Collaboration within Governing Interactions 
Attribute GI 
Collaboration Technical interactions: 
- ADNAP is dependent on the fleet to comply with regulations and fulfil   
requirements. Levels have been inadequate.  
- Catch verification is in principle to be performed by scientific institutes of flag state 
in cooperation with IIP (Informant 2 and 4, 2010). 
Biological 
It is crucial for IOTC members and cooperating parties o collaborate in order to 
implement resolutions and develop sustainable resouce management.   
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Flag state reports to IOTC. If the flag states fail to implement the relevant IOTC 
resolutions on data reporting the whole structure becomes weak (Informant 21, 2011). 
Governance meetings: 
Representatives collaborate on preparing and carrying out meetings and negotiations.   
 
How well actors at different scales collaborate appears to vary. The main problem is that 
some actors lack the incentive to collaborate, which especially is the case for the fleet and 
industry that potentially can benefit from not reporting catch positions and numbers. 
Politicians and technicians can also be reluctant to collaborate if interactions do not serve 
their main interests. In the case of the FPA, many representatives will be unwilling to commit 
to interactions that inflict on socio-economic interests. However, there appears to be a good 
dialogue between the representatives from the different governing institutions, and the EU 
Delegation in Mozambique seems to be of key importance by building a bridge of 
collaboration between the two parties. The fact that representatives in the Delegation are 
present in Mozambique and know how the systems of both parties work highly influences this 
process. Collaboration attributed to the GIs is asses ed to be at a medium to low level.      
5.4 Orders of governance 
Interactions at the three orders of governance are xplored in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of what is being done to achieve governance objectives, as well as what hinders 
it. The presentation that follows is based on the qu stions in table 6 and the findings will 
hopefully provide the researcher with the ability to make suggestions, in chapter 6, on how 
current or new forms of interactions could improve governance performance.   
5.4.1 First order governance 
SG 
What impacts decisions have on the natural system is crucial, since the ecosystem constitutes 
the foundation for conducting the FPA fishery. Decisions regarding fishing effort, practices 
and MCS clearly will have an effect on the resources, but the level of impacts and connections 
are not well studied. Potier et al. (2004) however refer to simulations conducted with a 
ECOSIM model, suggesting that removal of tuna by fishing could produce substantial 
structural changes in the ecosystem. Especially if catches are higher than the maximum 
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sustainable yield6 of the resources, consisting of high levels of juveniles and by catch or 
caught using environmental destructive fishing methods, the ecological impacts may be 
severe.  
 Decision making further involves determining the number of vessels allowed in the 
fisheries, provisions on landings, crew, fees and quotas of fish. The distant water fleet is 
dependent on access through agreements to remain fishi g, and ship owners, crew and their 
families depend on these fisheries for a living. Further producers need supplies of fish to 
maintain levels of employment and production. Prices and availability of tuna products on 
different markets may also be affected (EC, 2009). 
 There is no direct connection between the FPA fishery and Mozambican stakeholders, 
but through decision making they can be affected. Most significantly in relation to the level of 
financial compensation and its application, but also with regards to which provisions are 
given in terms of landing, production and employment in Mozambique. Such decisions can 
potentially both affect generation of income and leve  of food security (KusiLimitada, 2008).       
In conclusion, decisions may have substantial ecological and social impacts and these need to 
be accounted for before decisions are made.  
   
GS 
Technical management decisions concerning fishing practices, reporting requirements and so 
on are made and enforced by the government. The responsibility of biological management of 
the highly migratory resources does however fall under the responsibility of the IOTC, which 
is an organisation dependent on collaboration from the countries in the region and those 
fishing there in order to gather information about and manage the resources (Informant 1, 
2010; Informant 21, 2011). The level of engagement of stakeholders will however dictate how 
effective it is. There has not been developed any explicit harvest policy/management strategy, 
in other words a fully specified set of rules determining management actions, such as 
determining annual catch quotas or effort. But there is at present a resolution addressing these 
issues being discussed in IOTC forums. A management strategy generally includes 
specifications for a monitoring system, an assessment procedure, and a decision rule. In the 
Indian Ocean the involved parties have not managed to develop and agree on such a strategy. 
One reason for this is the lack of data needed as a b sis to determine which strategies are best 
suited, and the different strategies also have disadvantages  (Tong and Chen, 2010). The 
                                                  
6 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is the biologically calculated level of catch that, given a level of effort, can 
be taken from a stock over an indefinite period of time (Charles,2001). 
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report from IOTC’s Scientific meeting (2011c) emphasizes that given the multi-species nature 
of the fishery, management measures directed towards a single stock is likely to have effects 
on other stocks as well. The direction of magnitude of these effects can be difficult to 
understand. Piracy further impacts research programs in the Indian Ocean, especially the 
observer program.  
 The governance processes both in the EU and Mozambique involve participative 
stakeholder interactions such as consultations and hearings. Through technical and joint 
committee meetings and negotiations these interests are represented and the parties 
collaborate on reaching agreement of both technical and political character. However, even 
though agreement is found at the technical level, decisions in reality often are made top-down 
and political power is decisive. This was exemplified n the process of negotiating the current 
agreement in 2006. Agreement was not reached after sev ral rounds of negotiations in 
Brussels, as the Mozambican representatives were not co tent with the terms laid out. But 
when negotiations were about to close, there were given orders from the top political level to 
sign the agreement. On what grounds this decision was made is not clear for the public, but it 
is said that it was because of diplomatic reasons. Political considerations are common when 
decisions are to be taken, but the lack of clarity may lead to speculations on the motives. One 
of these speculations is that Mozambique did not want to jeopardize the good relationship 
they have with the EU – especially in relation to development support (Informant 2, 6 and 9, 
2010).  
 Co-governance procedures are in other words widely applied making decisions related 
to the FPAs, but some decisions are made using a top-down mode of governance. This 
includes decisions regarding enforcement of technical regulations, as well as top-level 
decisions of political importance. All decisions are part of a highly political environment, and 
it is claimed that political governance is the most important mode applied to decision making 
seen as political power seem to be able to affect and possibly even dictate the outcome.   
 
GI 
The parties carry out governance interactions under banners of shared benefits and equal 
powers. Conflicting interests are put up for discusion and negotiation, with the aim of 
satisfying both parties. While the Mozambican representatives have a clear objective of 
maximising revenue from a sustainable fishery, the EU representatives attend the meeting 
with a more complex agenda involving both economic, environment and development issues.  
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Most major governance decisions are made during joint c mmittee meetings, where a total of 
around twenty representatives from the two parties participate. While the EU delegation 
normally consists of representatives specialised on FPA matters and decision making, the 
Mozambican representatives are involved in such processes only once a year or more seldom. 
Mozambique neither has the financial capacity to make evaluations of the potential of their 
offshore resources nor the effect of the FPA, while EU on the other side makes evaluations 
both before and after concluding agreements. EU does n t share these evaluations openly, and 
the representatives thus have unequal levels of knowledge before making decisions. They do 
however, according to members of the Committee, intract in an open and constructive 
manner during meetings and there is a good relationsh p between the two parties, - even 
though they sometimes have difficulties in reaching agreement (Informant 1, 2 8, 9 and 10 
2010; Informant 18, 2011).   
5.4.2 Second order governance 
SG 
Interests are institutionalised through an open governance process including stakeholder 
participation at several levels. All stakeholders can participate and advocate their interests, but 
it is up to the Commission in the EU and the MoF in Mozambique to determine their level of 
importance and how they are to be represented in the proceeding steps of the process. 
Industrial and commercial interests do however tend to be better organised and attain a higher 
level of financial means than for instance those advocating environment, development or third 
country interests. This may affect their level of influence, and even though both the EU and 
Mozambican governing systems aim at reconciling a range of interests, those involving 
generation of economic and financial benefits will generally be more powerful than those 
representing costs (Informant 1, 2, 6 and 12). Onyango and Jentoft (2010) claim that there is a 
risk that problems remain unresolved if powerful interests get to define the agenda. Many 
stakeholders are often brought to the table, but their level of institutional influence tends to 
vary and it is a risk that some stakeholders dominate.  
 
GS 
Institutions both in Mozambique and in the EU are designed to enable participative 
interactions at all levels, with the aim of making the outcome of decisions efficient, effective 
and legitimate. Within the EU the Commission is given a great share of the responsibility, 
including practical management matters, collecting data, making proposals and conducting 
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negotiations. The Council and the Parliament does hwever hold the legislative powers. 
Through this structure the Commission will make proposals reflecting a range of stakeholder 
interests, and it is up to the legislative authorities o approve it. Both within the Parliament 
and the Council there is a continuous struggle betwe n interests. In relation to FPAs, countries 
with great economic and societal interests in the agr ements, like Spain, France and Italy will 
most often protect these interests and vote in favour of proposals supporting continued 
fishing, while countries in the north like Sweden, Denmark and the UK generally will vote 
more in favour of protecting the fish. This pattern recently manifested itself in the process of 
approving the controversial agreements with Mauritania nd Morocco. Seen as the Parliament 
recently has gained more power, the political parties are able to influence governance 
decisions more than previously. Their stands related to FPAs will vary, but the Green parties 
will generally take the most critical position (Informant 15 and 17, 2011).  
 Hearings and consultations about the agreements are car ied out also in Mozambique, 
but the specialised nature of the agreement and the lack of stakeholder organisation reduce the 
level of participants. Through different departments, directorates and institutes of the 
governing system, different interest fields are institutionalised. ADNAP is responsible for 
practical management tasks, DNEP and DCI for overarching economic and cooperation 
interests, while IIP is responsible for advocating biological concerns (Informant 6, 2010;   
Degnbol et al., 2002)  
 An increasing number of interests are being institutionalised, but the powers 
associated with them affect how they are represented i  the decision making process. 
Priorities and commitment further determine the outc me of decisions.   
 
GI 
During recent years the framework and set-up of institutions both in Mozambique and in the 
EU have increasingly been subject to new demands, an  reforms have been carried out in 
order to satisfy these. Characteristics such as participation, transparency, responsiveness and 
accountability should ideally be of high levels in order to gain legitimacy. According to the 
theory of new institutionalism, institutions need to be organized in such a way that they attain 
legitimacy within their institutional environment. To establish this relationship they need to 
reflect and respond to their cultural, social and political environment. Institutions will in other 
words evolve in response to the strategic actions of a field of actors (March and Olsen, 2005). 
The institutional structures of governing interactions related to the FPA include all these 
elements, and can be characterised as highly political, multi-levelled and bureaucratic. 
 73
Institutions seek to reflect and represent the stakeholders in the environment they are part of, 
and as a consequence they are of a very complex structure. Their performance will be 
determined by the efficiency and effectiveness of the governing interactions.     
 
5.4.3 Meta order governance 
SG 
The operators are mainly concerned with economic profitability, while many of them also will 
consider sustainability an important principle to conserve the resources they are exploiting. 
They are also concerned with maintaining a fair playing field on the fishing grounds, where 
all operators should be required to adhere to the same principles and regulations. Maintaining 
economic profitability is also an important part of the foundation for institutional formation 
and decision making. But the principles of responsibility and sustainability have increasingly 
become integrated into the institutions governing the FPA. These principles have become 
essential in order to legitimize and assess the quality of interactions, and problem solving has 
become more comprehensive than previously.  Sustainability is a pre-requisite for maintaining 
the fisheries and securing a basis for continuous development of the sector. The principle of 
responsibility has increased the obligations of the GS in the governance process. Previously 
the EU could attain pure commercial agreements with developing countries, but today this is 
more difficult due to increased number of international obligations towards supporting the 
developing countries.  But even though the mentioned principles have gained a more powerful 
position the recent years, it is still challenging to make decisions that reduce economic 
profitability. The interactions between stakeholders and governors are highly affected by the 
dynamics between them and the power they have to influence the governance interactions.  
 
GS 
The values, norms and principles of the governing institutions will highly affect how 
problems are defined, the agenda set and conflicts resolved. The institutions involved in 
governing the FPAs generally represent a wide range of different interests. While the focus of 
the scientific institutions, i.e. IOTC and IIP, will be to protect the resources and advocate 
principles on sustainability and precaution. The other institutions generally compromise 
economical, social and environmental interests, and will seek to have a broad focus reflecting 
all these dimensions. The fact that both institutions f the EU and the Mozambique aim to 
reflect a range of interests, as well as the principles of partnership, transparency, credibility, 
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subsidiarity and coherence, has made problem definition related to the FPA much wider and 
the agenda more comprehensive than previously. The incr ased number of interests and 
principles to maintain has however made conflict resolution more challenging. There is 
generally a lack of concrete indicators related to the the implementation of principles, and 




Stakeholders are increasingly focused on sustainability and legitimacy of interactions, and 
there is generally a good dialogue and cooperation on these matters. Representatives from the 
EU and Mozambique are besides obliged to promote many of the same objectives and ensure 
coherence between policy areas both between each other and at their internal arenas. These 
include transparency, legitimacy, coherence, good governance and so on. The EU has 
committed to contribute towards achieving the MDGs, and the overarching objective of EUs 
relations with African countries is eradication of p verty. Due to the Consensus on Policy 
Coherence for Development policy areas, such as the FPA, with potential to contribute to 
achieving these objectives need to be coherent with the overall development policy. In 
addition the FPA also needs to be coherent with the obj ctives of the Mozambican fisheries 
policy. The FPA is neither incoherent with the EU development policy nor the Mozambican 
fisheries policy, but is not expected to make any significant contribution either. The Country 
strategy paper does not address fisheries explicitly, but there is a potential for infrastructure 
and macro-economic support sectors to indirectly contribute if connected in a beneficial 
manner. The FPAs also have a potential to contribute to achieving MDGs related to poverty 
reduction, food security and so on, if implemented in an optimal manner. There is however 
different opinions on whether the FPAs shall be considered as development instruments or if 
they merely need to ensure that they are not incoherent with the development policy. The 
latter involves avoiding negative impacts the FPAs may have on development in the third 
country, while the former implies a commitment to realize a greater share of the development 
potential related to the FPAs.   
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6. Assessing governability and the potential of interactions 
The purpose of this study is to assess the limitations and potentials of the GS, including the 
EU, Mozambique and regional organizations, ability to govern the FPA and achieve a given 
objective. In order to do this, the system properties and attributes will first be translated into 
levels of governability. Assessing these levels will he p identify how different components 
affect governance performance and give an overview of the main challenges facing the GS. 
Matching the needs of the SG with the capacities of the GS is very useful as the ability to 
achieve desired governance outcomes is highly related to the match between the properties of 
the two systems. A discussion related to the levels of governability related to the different 
systems and how they affect governance performance follow in section 6.1. Thereafter 
interactions of the different orders of governance that can increase governability and enhance 
the ability to attain desired outcomes are suggested in section 6.2. 
6.1 Governability assessment  
Levels of system properties and attributes identified in chapter 5 are shown and translated into 
levels of governability in the table below.  
 
Table 24: Level of system properties, attributes and governability  
System 
properties 
                     SG 
Nat. syst.         Social system 
GS GI GI  
Attributes 
Diversity Medium High High Medium Participation 
Governability 
 
Moderate Low Low Moderate  
Complexity Medium High  High Medium-low Information 
Governability Moderate Low Low Moderate-
low 
 
Dynamics Medium Medium Medium  Medium Adaptation 
Governability Moderate Moderate Moderate    Moderate  
Scale Medium-
High 














The relatively small number of species involved in the FPA fishery indicates a moderate level 
of governability, as does the complexities and dynamics within the ecosystem these species 
are part of. The geographical scale of the natural system is however high, seen as the highly 
migratory behaviour of the species makes it necessary to take local, national and regional 
considerations. This challenges governance capacities and reduces governability. The 
temporal scale is however relative short, with reproduction rates and robust biological 
characteristics of most species making the system less vulnerable than in cases where the 
resources need longer time and more specific conditi s in order to reproduce. The overall 
governability of the natural system is assessed to be moderate.  
 One of the main challenges related to governing the natural system is that limited 
information about the resources and interconnection within the ecosystem, as well as levels of 
exploitation, make governance outcomes uncertain. This constitutes a major governability 
problem, which is highly challenging for the GS to handle. Caution should be applied, but it is 
important to be aware that there are limits to how cautious a GS can be before it becomes 
ungovernable itself (Jentoft, 2006b). The IOTC applies the principle of the precautionary 
approach in their recommendations, but fishing activity s carried out also on stocks of an 
uncertain status.  The regional character of the resources challenges governance cooperation 
across borders, especially in relation to handling IUU fishing and piracy. These days piracy is 
a very important component reducing governability, both because catch levels are uncertain 
and because fishing operations and patterns are changed due to security reasons. Walmsley et 
al. (2007a) emphasize that weak management and corrupti n are factors that can leave the 
fisheries open to IUU fishing and financial contribution open to misappropriation. This can 
potentially limit the impact the FPA can have on improving fisheries management and 
contribute to sustainable fisheries, and it is important that the performance of the GS is 
monitored in order to identify such problems. The natural system is the basis for fisheries 
development and long term generation of benefits for M zambique, and it is therefore crucial 







Fish can, as mentioned, be a source of food, employent and revenue, and the diversity of 
stakeholders with different interests and motives in relation to the FPA is as a consequence 
high - as are the complexities and dynamics between th m. The European fleets and industry, 
including crew, production workers and the communities hey are part of, put pressure on 
maximising fishing effort while reducing costs. The government and people of Mozambique 
on the other hand aim for maximized benefits. Conservation orientated actors exist at both 
sides, putting pressure on long term sustainability. The stakeholders are found at all scales; 
local, national, regional and international. The ovrall governability of the socio-economic 
system is as a result of all these factors low.  
 The wide range and scale of stakeholders reduces the governability of the SG in the 
process of trying to reconcile highly conflicting interests. The organisation of and power 
associated with the different stakeholders tend to affect the governance process, and it is a 
challenge for the GS to facilitate their involvement in such a manner that decision making is 
fair and efficient. As for the case of the FPA where the objectives of the agreement are 
threefold, it is decisive how stakeholders supporting each of the objectives are represented 
and how they are linked to power that can influence the outcome. The fact that industrial 
interests tend to be better organised and have moreinstitutional influence than other 
stakeholders is a factor that enhances the ability to achieve objectives that favour these, while 
it is a risk that the objective of promoting development of sustainable development of the 
fisheries sector in the third country may be reduce. Internal conflict and disagreement of 
what commitment involves may also reduce governability. Different actors have different 
views of what should and could be done, and without discussions and coordination much of 




The governing system is characterized by high divers ty and complexity, with medium to high 
levels of dynamics and scale being a highly important issue. Both the governing systems in 
Mozambique and in the EU consist of numerous units representing a wide range of different 
and conflicting interests, and the task of trying to reconcile these both within and between 
units reduce governability. Based on the high level of system properties, governability related 
to the GS is assessed to be low.  
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 GS’s ability to perform is hinged upon how well its capacities are matched with the 
needs of the SG. In the case of governing the FPA it seems there is a relatively good match 
between the two systems. The properties of the socio-economic part of the SG are identical, 
while the properties of the GS generally are a bit higher than the ones of the natural system. 
This indicates that there exists more than sufficient capacities to govern the SG. This ability is 
however also dependent on how well the GS manages to govern itself. The highly diverse and 
complex structure of the GS both in Mozambique, in the EU and in regional organisations 
makes this a challenging task in itself. According to Jentoft (2006b) there are limits to how 
high system properties the GS can have before it becom s ungovernable. As a consequence of 
the reduced level of detailed information about the resources and their value, the structure of 
the GS is based on theories and hypotheses about the form of the SG. The construction of 
mechanisms and procedures to handle this in an optimal manner is as mentioned one of the 
most important and challenging tasks of the GS. The performance of the GS will further 
depend on its commitment and effectiveness in the gov rnance process. Lack of commitment 
naturally reduces the potential for achieving given objectives. If decisions are made without 
any effort to withhold them, they have no effect in practice. The execution of power within 
the GS is another component affecting governance outcomes. Jentoft (2006a) emphasizes that 
fisheries governance must be backed up by power in order to be effective, and decision 
making, implementation and enforcement are all acts of power. Fisheries governance may 
also provoke power and encounter resistance. The political and institutional context affects 
power relations, and it is important to assess how it is executed and affects outcomes. Within 
the GS of this case study, power seems to be a highly relevant component, seen as it in 
principle shall be a result of all incorporated interests. Some interests do, as mentioned, seem 
to be more influential than others and they will to a higher degree affect how power is 
executed. It is, according to Jentoft (2006a); important to be aware of the fact that the most 
powerful may have the possibility to ensure that the process benefits them and block reforms 
that could reduce this level. Reduced compliance with set procedures on how institutional 
power shall be developed and a lack of clear mandates on how power shall be executed might 
reduce governability. 
     
GI 
 
The governing interactions between the GS and SG determine how governability is facilitated. 
The levels of participation, communication, adaptation and collaboration will affect how 
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effective this process is and thus the ability to achieve objectives. Attributes of the governing 
interactions related to governing the FPA are generally at a moderate to low level, indicating 
that there lies potential for improved performance of the governing system if the level of 
attributes is increased. It is however necessary to be aware that, for instance, high levels of 
participation and communication need to be properly facilitated in order to increase 
governability and not reduce it.  
 The efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy and the level of justice related to the GIs will 
determine the outcome. The efficiency of the GIs related to governing the FPA is moderate to 
low. The selection of a narrow range of participants taking part in the main governing 
interactions, such as the Joint Committee, the Scientific Meeting and IOTC meetings makes 
interactions more efficient than if a wider range of actors were to participate. The participants 
do however represent a wide range of interests, making it difficult to make important 
decisions before consultations are carried out and this is time consuming. The effectiveness of 
interactions will depend on how coherent they are and how well participants cooperate on 
enforcing them. If interactions of the different acors are highly contradictory or if decisions 
are not adhered to or enforced, the effectiveness will be reduced. This is likely to be the case 
when governing the FPA, seen as the participants have contradicting objectives and their 
willingness to comply or voluntary enforces decision  that undermine their main interests will 
be low. Legitimacy of outcomes is linked to their lvel of acceptance from the stakeholders. 
The level of collaboration between them through interactions will therefore affect this level. 
In the case of the FPA a wide range of stakeholders are involved in order to maintain a high 
level of legitimacy. The risk is that the processes ek to enhance legitimacy, but it is the 
execution of power that will determine the outcome. According to Walmsley et al. (2007a), a 
partnership indicates comparable status and power within a relationship. Even though 
cooperation between the two parties are good and Mozambique are becoming a stronger 
partner than previously, the EU still has more resources, more information and more 
experience and remains more powerful. The outcome of interactions often has a higher level 
of benefits accruing the EU than Mozambique. It is difficult to determine how just this is, and 
the wide range of opinions will be based on different views of what commitment involves.  
6.2 Interactions of the orders of governance 
As presented in chapter two of the thesis, a combinatio  of interactions related to the three 
orders of governance is needed to achieve desired governance outcomes. According to 
Kooiman (2008), interactions are specific forms of actions taken by actors to remove 
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obstacles or create new opportunities. In the case of the FPAs the objectives related to meta-
order governance are already set, and the focus of this study will therefore concentrate on how 
interactions of first and second order are carried out in order to complement this. The 
institutionalisation and practical implementation, including problem solving and opportunity 
creation, of objectives determines the format of governance outcomes. Based on the 
limitations identified through the governability asse sment in section 6.1, interactions that can 
improve governance performance in relation to promoting sustainable development of the 
fisheries sector in Mozambique are suggested in the following. In order to present these 






Natural resources are the basis for fisheries development, and can potentially generate wealth 
for eternity if governed in a sustainable manner. Developing capacities, measures and 
instruments to do so therefore needs to be a priority also in relation to governing the FPA 
(EBCD, 2010). Doing more research on the highly migratory species and the ecosystem they 
belong to is vital if the GS’s ability to govern the SG is to be enhanced. In terms of second 
order governance this involves institutionalizing as much scientific research capacity as 
possible. Since the resources are of regional charater nd the management responsibility 
belongs to IOTC, cooperation with them is highly important. EU has since the conception of 
IOTC in 1996 been an active member of the organization, while Mozambique on the other 
only has observed some of its work. But in March 2011 Mozambique was granted status as 
cooperating non-contracting party of the IOTC, and commit to implementing all IOTC 
resolutions (IOTC, 2011b). There is as a consequence of this great potential for increased 
governability, depending on how well the institutional arrangements are set up and how 
actions of first order governance support this. According to the IOTC secretariat (Informant 
21, 2011), it is vital that the members and cooperating non-contracting parties of the IOTC 
process develop an understanding of how the IOTC works and what their responsibilities are 
in order to address institutional and technical shortfalls. As the responsibility for 
implementing the decisions of the Commission are devolv d to state level, it is only when 
they understand and reflect on their ability to make the required decisions that progress will 
be made. How well prepared and engaged the various states are before the decision making is 
of key importance for the success of the IOTC process. In addition, it is of key importance 
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that the members and cooperating parties not only take pride in being part of decision making, 
but also effectively implement these decisions at natio al level. Decisions are made in a 
cooperative manner within the IOTC, but it is the responsibility of the states to give effect to 
them.   
 In order to ensure long term sustainability, the FPA should be based on comprehensive 
management plans, and there should be flexible adjustments of access based on yearly 
resource assessments (Mwikya, 2006). The agreement includes provisions on reviewing the 
fishing opportunities by mutual agreement after advice from the scientific meeting. The 
problem is however that there is a lack of data to give such advice. IOTC provides regional 
data on the stocks, but these are applied with caution. There is currently no harvest limitation 
related to highly migratory species, and with the exception of a limitation on fishing capacity 
there is not any other measures to govern the resouces either. The reference tonnage of the 
FPA is not a harvest limitation, but a catch level linked to a given financial compensation. 
The vessels are allowed to fish more, if they pay an additional fee per tonne (COM, 2007). 
This link between the financial compensation and the level of catch may give the 
Mozambican government an incentive to allow higher catches than what is recommended. To 
decouple access from funds is one way of increasing the overnability, because the incentive 
mentioned above is eliminated and sustainability will be the core focus of resource managers.     
 It is also crucial that catch numbers and other data given in by vessels and research 
institutes are as correct as possible. Lack of reporting and underreporting of catches reduce 
governability. IOTC receives aggregated data from the flag states of the fleets fishing in the 
region, and it is vital that resolutions on data reporting are implemented in flag state 
institutions (second order governance) and adhered to in practice (first order governance). 
IUU is a huge problem in the South West Indian Ocean, and it is important that MCS capacity 
is improved in order to enforce governance measures in practice. Ilnyckyj (2007) claims that a 
general lack of enforcement feeds a culture in which IUU fishing is tolerated and indirectly 
encouraged, rather than punished and stigmatized. Implementation of IOTC’s observer 
programme, auto sampling (collection of data of trained personnel) and registration of bycatch 
are actions of first order governance that potentially c n help correct the catch numbers. It is 
also highly important that the level of fishing activity of other fleets in the area, Asian and 
local small – and semi-industrial fleets, are determined and shared in a more transparent 
manner in order to develop an accurate estimation on the state of the stocks. Witbooi (2008) 
emphasizes the need for enhanced regional cooperation among coastal states to develop more 
sustainable fisheries governance both domestically and regionally through improved 
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generation and flow of fisheries data and improved MCS capacities. Measures to fight IUU 
and systems for data analysis need to be harmonised, and structures and mechanisms that 
enable dialogue between researchers, managers and professionals should be set up at a 
regional basis. Interactions could include joint surveillance missions and harmonization of 
legislation on technical measures. Much of this type of cooperation can be facilitated through 
the IOTC and other regional organisations like IOC, SWIOFC and SADC, but the mandates 
of the different organisations need to be evaluated in order to coordinate cooperation in an 
effective manner. More and better support should be generated to support these organisations. 
 Informant 1 (2010) claims that limited availability of marine resources, also can 
hamper development of the fisheries sector in Mozambique in the long run. The government 
can’t project development that goes beyond the potential resources that are below 400 000 
tons. In order to increase the fisheries production, development of the aquaculture sector is 
encouraged. This is highlighted both in the new Master Plan of the fisheries sector in 
Mozambique and a objective related to developing aquaculture is also included as one of the 
objectives related to the execution of the FPA funds. In addition sustainable governance of the 
artisanal fisheries must be mentioned, seen as it is v al to maintain its generation of benefits 
to the coastal population in Mozambique. 
 
Socio-economic system  
 
The high level of stakeholders indicates low governability. But according to Walmsley et al. 
(2007a), the multiplicity of stakeholders is a potential source to be tapped rather than a 
problem and stakeholder participation is also emphasized in the governance literature. 
Inclusive interactions will increase the ability of learning and in the process make the system 
more adaptive. It is however vital that involvement is organised and institutionalised in a 
proper manner while interactions need to be well structured if participation is to increase 
governability and not make interactions inefficient. S akeholders are according to Jentoft 
(2006b) identified by the urgency of their concerns, the legitimacy of their interests or the 
power they hold. The European fleets and industry are well organised and represented in 
several advisory committees related to DWF and a regional advisory council on long distance 
fisheries within the EC. Conservation oriented stakeholders are also part of such committees 
and councils, but are not as many in number. Because of the specialised nature of the FPA 
there is most often little interest from the general public. The stakeholders that are represented 
in different fora are therefore of a relative narrow range and of a specialised nature. Trying to 
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generate more public interest and involvement both in e EU and Mozambique would give 
the discussions more voices, and if institutionalised in a constructive manner potentially 
improve the level of governability. More voices advocating development of the fisheries 
sector in third countries could generate more initiative and potentially development of new 
strategies on how to realise this objective in practice.  
 The agreement includes provisions encouraging setting up joint ventures, landing 
catch and bycatch and employing Mozambican crew. Imple enting these initiatives would 
increase the promotion of development of the fisheries sector in Mozambique. None of the 
provisions are however obligatory and there has been little or no sign of implementation in 
practice. The high seasonal variation and regional nature of the fisheries makes it difficult to 
set up joint ventures, as the vessels only stay a short time in Mozambican waters. According 
to Obaidullah and Osinga (2010) it is also necessary to be aware that joint ventures can 
include reflagging of EU vessels and the loss of EU control over the fleets. This could 
potentially undermine fisheries governance and make it hard to determine actual levels of 
foreign fishing effort. CFFA (2009) points to the ned for cost-benefit analyses before 
investments are started and it should be an overarching principle that these investments not 
shall be at the expense of local initiatives. Lack of port and production facilities further makes 
landing and production of catch impossible as the situation is today. The need for developing 
an onshore infrastructure, including port facilities, cold stores and production plants is high. 
Investment to develop this should be generated, either through private investors or through 
foreign development support. This should not be done without thorough evaluations of costs 
and potential. Both the Seychelles and Madagascar have developed domestic infrastructures 
for landing and producing tuna, and experience from these two countries should be evaluated.   
There are different opinions of the quantity and value of bycatch, but it is claimed that even 
relatively low levels can be a significant contribution to food security in Mozambique. CFFA 
(2006) however emphasizes that it is necessary to be aware that landings of low value non-
targeted species may disrupt local markets and undermin  viability of local artisanal fisheries, 
and it is therefore important to develop appropriate mechanisms to distribute these resources. 
Lack of skilled Mozambican crew, different cultural background and logistical costs are 
according to Mwikya (2006) reasons why there is no Mozambicans employed aboard FPA 
vessels, and further suggests that policies aimed at training local crew and staff should be 
implemented. Acquiring experience from the offshore fisheries would contribute to building 
social capital valuable if Mozambique wishes to participate in this fishery themselves in the 
future. In addition it would be a source of employment, benefitting Mozambican families. In 
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order to give greater incentives for implementing such provisions, one could possibly give 
support or reduce fees for vessel owners fulfilling certain requirements - such as using 
sustainable equipment, employing Mozambican crew and l ding fish in Mozambique. It is 
already suggested to make port inspection of vessels prior to starting to fish obligatory in 
order to gain more control and possibly generate some income from the vessels use of port 
facilities and other services. It is also important to remember that FPA operators have more 
obligations than other DWF, and it is important to ensure that all fleets fishing in the 
Mozambican Fishing zone need to comply with the same technical requirements. If there is 
not a fair playing field, the incentive of the operators to comply can be reduced.          
 At the moment Mozambique receives 100 euro per ton of fish caught, of which the 
vessel operators pay 35 euro for access and the Union 65 euro as financial support. In addition 
the EU pays 250 000 euro specifically to support of the development of the Mozambican 
fisheries sector. Given levels are pre-paid according to quantities and species, in order to 
secure a certain level of payment independent of fishing activity (COM, 2007). The FPA 
vessel operators pay lower license fees than other for ign operators fishing for highly 
migratory species in Mozambique, but the EU financil support increases the total level. 
Critics argue European fleets are subsidised by the Union, something which is in conflict with 
the framework of the EU. In addition, the fact that the financial compensation is linked to 
levels of exploitation may give incentives for Mozambique to allow access to unsustainable 
levels, while vessels might be motivated to underrepo t catches to reduce costs. To prevent 
this, vessel operators should pay the total cost of access for fishing and the financial support 
from the Union should be completely uncoupled from levels of catch.  The new reform 
proposal suggests such actions (EC, 2011a). In order to prevent underreporting, MCS 
capacity, involving interactions both of second andfirst order, needs to be increased. 
Institutional capacity needs to be further developed, while interactions of first order are 
crucial for practical implementation. Mozambique has d some problems setting up the VMS 
protocol, but as this now is functioning, more data should become available (Informant 2 and 
3, 2010). In addition, the new cooperation with IOTC will also provide Mozambique more 
information about the EU fleets activity and thus increase governability. Lack of reporting of 
entry-exit information and catch numbers are according to informants (Informant 1, 2 and 3, 
2010) still insufficient and there is a need for stronger commitment and more enforcement in 
order to improve these levels. Mozambique has the opportunity to withdraw licenses when 
requirements are not being withheld and it is important that the Mozambican authorities 
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actually use the hammer and enforce the requirements through first order interactions when 
this happens.  
 It is claimed that the dependency on EU funds could hinder development of the tuna 
fisheries in Mozambique. According to Walmsley et al. (2007a), fisheries agreements may not 
provide the right incentive to improve governance and fisheries policy. They may rather 
distract the ability to achieve this due to the steady stream of guaranteed income for several 
years, without the need to govern the stocks in a manner that provides sustainable resource 
rent. Some tuna is already being caught by small-sce and semi-industrial fleets, and the 
potential to increase these levels should be explored. The capacities of these fleets should be 
assessed and there should be greater mobilization of potential investors in order to develop 
joint ventures or even Mozambican offshore vessels. CFFA (2006) emphasizes the need for 
developing a favorable environment for economic activity around tuna in order to increase 
fisheries development in the long term. The small and semi-industrial fisheries sectors in 
Mozambique are generally fully exploited, and it is vital for Mozambique to be more involved 
in the offshore sector in order to maintain and improve levels of revenue from the fisheries 
also in the future. While some argue that in today’s globalised world it does not matter who 
does the fishing as long as the host country maximizes rent capture. Others claim that fishing 
is much more than trade, with socio-economic benefits that are better realized with domestic 
fishing. Both arguments need to be considered. Mozambique has no capacity to exploit their 
offshore resources at the moment, and access agreements are currently the only source of 
revenue. Given the high cost of developing an offshre fleet, the agreements might be the best 
option at present. But thorough cost-benefit analysis should always form the basis for entering 
such agreements, enhancing Mozambique’s opportunity to claim appropriate levels of rent. A 
gradual development of a domestic offshore fleet would however give the Mozambicans more 
control of and a better opportunity to extract higher levels of rent from the fisheries. 
Chartering vessels or setting up joint ventures could be the first steps in this process, reducing 
the cost and risk associated to owning vessels. Evaluations of facilities and incentives are 
needed to increase fisheries development in Mozambique are vital, as are the development of 
a strategy on how such development is envisioned in both the short and long term.   
   
GS  
 
The high level of uncertainty related to the SG requires the GS to be correspondingly flexible, 
involving interactions that continuously transfer information between the two systems and 
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efficiently feed into the GS. The capacities within the GS are high, but in order to apply these 
to solve governance challenges related to the SG and achieve desired outcomes, they need to 
be organised in an effective manner. Borrman and Busse (2007) claim that the quality of 
institutions is vital and that the real dimension of institutional challenges is often not fully 
recognised due to lack of empirical insight. In order to enhance the performance of the GS, 
integrated forms of second order governance is needed, involving building bridges between 
formal and informal institutions. In relation to the FPAs, this is already done through advisory 
committees, regional advisory councils and inter-servic  consultations in the EU and 
ministerial consultations and hearings in Mozambique. It is the responsibility of DG MARE’s 
unit for bilateral agreements and fisheries control in international to coordinate these 
interactions within the EU and incorporate the result of them into the GS and represent them 
in the governance process. In Mozambique, DNEP is the most important coordinator, but 
other departments and institutions are also involved in preparing consultations. According to 
new institutionalism theory (March and Olsen, 2005), there is a contemporary trend to involve 
stakeholders and interests in the GS in order to attain legitimacy. There is however a risk that 
the lack of connection to institutional power reduces their possibility to actually affect 
governance outcomes, and stakeholder involvement remains more of a cosmetic fix. It is 
therefore important to study the GS in its political and institutional context in order to assess 
power relations. According to Jentoft (2006), fisheries governance is not only an instrument 
for power, but also the outcome of power. The institutional procedures on how institutional 
power is shaped and exercised therefore need to be explicit and transparent and indicators on 
performance need to be developed. Schaik and Kaeding (2008) claim the organization within 
the EU has a administrative level and a political leve . There are signs that this is also the case 
in Mozambique. If objectives are to be achieved, interactions at both levels need to be 
coherent. Reporting lines and responsibility for activities need to be clear and transparent in 
order to secure that governance performance is maintained.   
 Song and Chuenpagdee (2010) claim there is a tendency to overrate the capacities of 
the GS, and hence increasing the risk for inappropriate design of institutions. Jentoft (2007) 
suggests that institutional experimentation can be ecessary to identify what type of 
interactions are needed and what potential exists within the institutions. It is further vital that 
the GS manages to define an appropriate balance between biological, economic and social 
dimensions, and determines the importance and forms f representation related to each 
dimension in the governance process. Clear strategies and mandates will make the process 
more efficient and the outcome more predictable. It is also important to be aware that the high 
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level of scale of the SG poses a great challenge on the units of the GS. When states do not 
match the scale involved, regional and international rganizations need to take responsibility. 
The problem with such organizations is that they often are too weak to fill the gap, and 
governability is reduced. Commitment to improve global governance should according to the 
United Kingdom’s permanent representation to the EU (2009) be a priority since an 
increasingly high number of governance problems accrue on the global scale.    
 Institutional procedures decoupled from first order interactions have no effect in 
practice. It is hence essential that practical problem solving and opportunity creation are 
carried out through institutional arrangements. To give technical support and advice that can 
support fisheries development in practice is very important and cooperation between actors at 
all levels of the two parties need to be encouraged. Institutional commitment to promote and 
implement the objective is another factor of vital mportance. Commitment determines the 
performance of the GS. Because of the wide range of interests represented within the GS, 
voluntary commitment will be challenged at many levels. The strong representation of 
commercial interests within various units of the GScan undermine interactions, both of first 
and second order, that are reducing economic profits. It is essential to develop a certain level 
of voluntary commitment to make the GS function. This should be motivated by moral 
principles and the will to legitimize interactions and should be collectively enforced. The high 
conflict level within the GS does, however, indicate  need for governmental enforcement to 
ensure commitment. In relation to the objective of promoting fisheries development, concrete 
indicators or terms and conditions should be developed in order to measure the level of 
implementation. Without such indicators it will be v ry difficult to assess what is and what 
should be done, and it will be easy to claim success when it is not or criticize when there is no 
reason to do so. As a result of the Lisbon treaty the European External Action Service is set 
up in order to ensure coherence between EUs external policy areas, and this unit could 
potentially evaluate the level of commitment to development objectives. Synergies within the 
GS that could enhance this ability to achieve the giv n objective should also be explored. The 
potential of other policy units to contribute should be encouraged. Closer interdisciplinary 
cooperation between development representatives in DG Development and Cooperation – 
EuropeAid and DG MARE, for instance through working groups, could help identify 
alternative forms of first order interactions that could enhance governance performance.  
 In addition to ensuring EU commitment, it is just a  important to secure that the 
Mozambican authorities commit to implementing the objectives of the FPA. Commitment is 
needed at all levels in the GS. In order to promote fisheries development they need to employ 
 88
the financial contribution from the agreement in an optimal way, while putting pressure on the 
provisions of the agreement that can give additional benefits and added value to the country. 
Through the current agreement the Mozambican authorities have full discretion on how the 
financial support is spent, but the total amount is to benefit the fisheries sector and 250 000 
euro is to be used specifically for the support of fisheries development. Mozambique has 
developed a matrix showing their priority areas for utilizing the money, linked to both specific 
projects and overall objectives. The recent years, a great share of the money has been applied 
for building new facilities for the MoF or improving governance infrastructures. While some 
consider top facilities essential for carrying out governance interactions and attracting high 
level personnel, others are critical of the choice f priorities. It is nonetheless important that 
all decisions and interactions are based on evaluations prioritizing the needs of the sector, and 
further account openly for these choices and develop long term strategies for the spending of 
the EU funds. The possibility to connect FPA activities with ongoing projects in Mozambique 
is also an opportunity that should be explored. Capacities and potential both within and 
outside the GS should be assessed. Governmental or non-governmental projects concentrated 
in the same domain as the priority areas of the FPAcould improve the GS’s performance. The 
Mozambican GS could also potentially benefit from being more open, and cooperate with 
external actors on evaluations and projects that could improve their level of information and 




The specialized nature of the FPA leads to a narrow ange of participants in the main 
governance interactions. In order to increase insight and generate more involvement, both the 
interactions through the Scientific meeting and Joint Committee meetings should be more 
participatory – including representatives from the civil society, member states without direct 
relations to the DWFs, other sector representatives (d velopment, trade, etc.) and external 
researchers. Information on the agreements, involving ex-ante and ex-post evaluations, should 
be made publicly available both to ensure transparency of the processes and make it easier for 
the general public to generate knowledge and views about the agreements.  
 Uneven representation and power relations between the stakeholders may push 
governance outcomes in certain directions. The fisher es industry is of great economic and 
social importance in many countries and may, as a result, also has a strong political influence 
both on the EC representatives and the member states representatives. It is challenging to 
make decisions reducing fishing when both household budgets and national economies 
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depend on it. The European fleets and the tuna industry involved in the FPA are very well 
organised and powerful, while stakeholders in third countries often are less organised and 
possess less resources. Environmental and development actors and others defending the 
principles of conservation and long term sustainability have however gotten stronger and 
more numerous over the years. Political power seems to be a decisive factor for the outcome 
of interactions and in order to prevent that some actors dominate, it is important that mandates 
are clear and restrictions are put on how power is xecuted. The technical and political levels 
of governance should be clearly separated and all ch nnels to economic and political interests 
should be transparent. When signing an agreement is a political decision overruling technical 
discussions, the reason for making such a decision sh uld be made clear. Lack of information 
leads to speculations and reduces legitimacy and information should therefore be shared 
openly in order to avoid this.  It is important to be aware that the GIs have intended and 
unintended consequences, the latter being a result from tension among objectives, interests 
and purposes behind interactions.   
 It is important to be aware that all governance int ractions affect the outcome, also 
those that are not planned (Kooiman et al., 2008). There is a need to genuinely appreciate and 
understand the different interests, motives and values held by the various stakeholders. If the 
industrial interests are not heard and economical profitability of the fleets is undermined, 
these stakeholders may get an incentive to not comply with the regulations. In order to enable 
a truly collaborative process that can reconcile the existing differences, all stakeholders need 
to be heard and understood. If stakeholders agree on the form of first and second order 
interactions, they will generally tend to have a greater will to respond to them and 
governability will increase. The industrial stakeholders are neither involved in the Joint 
Committee nor the Scientific Committee, but their interests are represented through the EC 
and the member state representatives. According to a representative from Cepesca (Informant 
24, 2011), they are not part of the meetings but they will often travel to the place the meeting 
is held and follow the development of negotiations. They normally get informed about the 
status through the member state representatives. Th Commission on the other hand does not 
interact with the stakeholders at this level of the process. It is highly important that the form 
of such interactions is agreed upon by all stakeholders, in order to prevent that the process can 
be influenced through the back door.  
 Furthermore, the level of information and experience of the parties involved in the 
governance interactions will affect the outcome. While the representatives from the EU are 
highly specialized on the FPA issue, the Mozambican representatives are less experienced. 
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There is a risk that Mozambique shares a lot of information, while the EU calculates what it 
shares, undermining the partnership dimension of the agreement. It is therefore highly 
important that the Mozambican representatives are well prepared for both first and second 
order interactions. They need to develop an understanding of the institutional system and 
capacities involved in order to enhance their performance. An EDCD (2010) report emphasize 
the importance of cooperation between ACP countries as a source to increase this ability. By 
sharing information and experience in relation to governing the FPAs, performance of the GS 
can potentially be improved through new forms of governance interactions. The report further 
focuses on the importance of enforceability: “[Without enforceability] the outcome will be a 
function of an underlying power equation, which does not necessarily do justice to equity” 
(EBCD, 2010:61). 
 According to representatives involved in the interactions (Informant 1, 2, 8 and 9, 
2010; Informant 18, 2011), there is a good dialogue between the parties and the FPA between 
the EU and Mozambique is claimed to be one of the best agreements with regards to the will 
to support. It is clear that the provisions of the agreement generally are improving, but the 
lack of implementation remains a challenge. Many of the norms and principles related to the 
FPA are relatively abstract and the lack of specific definitions and concrete indicators makes 
it challenging to assess if and at what level they are being applied. Unclear definition of 
objectives can also be a way of handling conflict and increase governability, this because 
there will be room for discussions, and the lack of consensus around definition will make it 
more difficult to identify winners and looser. Unclear objectives will however make it 
difficult to achieve them, and in order to effectively implement them, it is first of all important 
to develop a common understanding of what they involve. Through a cooperative process, 
indicators related to their performance should be developed. It is further important to facilitate 
different instruments in order to implement the different objectives. Enforcement is necessary 
if commitment to achieve objectives shall be maintained. If indicators related to promoting 
sustainable development in Mozambique are low, access ould for instance be limited or fees 
increased.  
 An important component related to the GIs of the FPA is that the process of 
governance cooperation provides Mozambique with an opportunity to learn and enhance their 
governance capacities. Through cooperative interactions both at first and second order, 
information and experience can be acquired. Cooperativ  discussions on governance issues, 
execution of funds and how development of the fisheries sector in Mozambique can be 
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enhanced, can contribute to identifying new opportunities and ways of solving problems. 
Through this process of learning governability can be increased.   
 The fact that Mozambique is dependent on DWF to exploit the offshore resources, 
while the EU fleet is dependent on access to remain fishing, creates a mutual interdependency 
of developing agreements. The FPA has the potential to benefit both parties and the 
agreement can be viewed as a public and commercial investment in mutual interests of the 
two parties. Collaborative interactions are vital to ensure that the agreement is maintained, 
and the responsibility to do so is shared between th  parties. It is however important that the 
boundaries for interactions related to the agreement are clear, so that not only one of the 
parties benefits. In the long run the objectives of maintaining access and developing a 
Mozambican fishing fleet are not compatible, and strategies for how this future development 













In this concluding chapter, the research objectives will be revisited in section 7.1, before a 
short assessment of the research process – its challenges and results- is conducted in section 
7.2. At last a review of future research needs is given in section 7.3. 
7.1 Revisiting the research objectives 
By conducting a governability assessment of the FPAbetween the EU and Mozambique, the 
components involved in the governance process have been studied in a systematic manner. 
Needs of the system-to-be-governed have been describ d, capacities of the governing system 
assessed and the limitations and potential of governing interactions have been explored.  
  
- The first research question was focused on studying the match between the GS and the SG, a 
determining factor for how responsive the GS is. The assessment shows that the existing 
capacities of the GS generally are a bit higher than e needs of the SG, and should therefore 
in principle be able to handle the challenges involved. It is however important to be aware that 
the properties of the GS are at such high levels that i  is challenging to govern the GS itself. 
The high level of interests represented, number of governing units and bureaucratic 
procedures involved is likely to reduce governability and the responsiveness of the GS.  
  
- The second research question aimed to identify which components of the SG, GS and GI 
that limit the ability to achieve one of the overarching objectives of the FPA: promoting 
sustainable development of the fisheries sector in the third country. The findings from the 
assessment indicate that the lack of information about the natural system makes governance 
outcomes uncertain. Even though the catch data is reported to both Mozambique and IOTC, 
and the latter prepares stock assessments and recommendations for the highly migratory 
species in the Indian Ocean, the actual level of exploitation and the state of the stocks are 
uncertain. The outcome of any decisions related to exploiting the resources will 
correspondingly also be uncertain, making it difficult to assess the available potential for 
further fisheries development. Informant 1 (2010) also highlights that limited marine 
resources can hamper development, as the government can ot project development beyond 
the potential of the resources (400 000 tons).  
 The wide range of stakeholders having an interest in the FPA further affects the 
governance outcomes through their involvement in first and second order governance, in other 
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words, through institutional arrangements and practic l problem solving and opportunity 
creation. The fact that some of the stakeholders are better organised and more powerful than 
others affects the dynamics of the process. Commercial interests are often well-organised and 
better connected with institutional powers than other stakeholders, something that can reduce 
the ability to promote development of the fisheries s ctor in Mozambique. It is not that these 
stakeholders necessarily are against this objective, but their willingness to promote actions 
that reduce economic profitability is low or non-existing.  
 The high level of system properties related to the GS makes it challenging to govern. 
Reduced efficiency and effectiveness related to the processes of decision making and 
distribution of responsibilities may further reduce th  ability to achieve the given objective. 
Unclear mandates related to execution of power clearly reduce governability, as the GS 
processes that are meant to dissolve power amongst stakeholders in reality simply become 
sub-ordinate arrangements, with limited influence on the actual execution of power. 
Disagreement of what successful implementation of the objective involves also makes it 
challenging to assess the current state of affairs. The lack of indicators related to what 
promoting sustainable development of the fisheries sector involves could reduce the ability to 
assess what is and what could be done to improve this ability. Mozambique has however 
developed a matrix where FPA funds are linked to objectives and projects in the Mozambican 
fisheries sector, and this increases governability.  
 Further the lack of enforcement related to commitment, public or governmental, tends 
to reduce the ability to implement objectives that are not economically profitable. The number 
of representatives involved and the information andexperience they hold through governing 
interactions will also highly affect the governance outcome. While the EU delegation includes 
experienced well-informed representatives, the Mozambican representatives have more 
limited experience with governing such agreements ad their level of knowledge is much 
lower. This may reduce the ability of the Mozambicans to identify and promote components 
with potential of increasing fisheries development.    
  
- The last research question aimed to explore what interactions of first and second order 
governance potentially can improve the ability to pr mote the objective of sustainable 
development in the third country. Interactions were suggested in relation to the three systems. 
First, in order to improve the governability of the natural system, making it easier to achieve 
given objectives, institutionalization of scientific research capacity is essential. Interactions of 
first order governance include data collection, repo ting and enforcement of regulations 
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related to exploitation of the resources. Then, regional cooperation on MCS, especially related 
to the fight against piracy and IUU fishing is highli ted. It is also emphasized that the 
potential of the marine resources is not infinite, while the potential for increasing production 
from aquaculture is immense and this should be developed. In addition, the artisanal fisheries 
should be governed in a sustainable manner, in order to maintain benefits for the coastal 
population.  
 Including stakeholders in interactions of second order governance will generally 
increase governability, but their organization and the procedures connecting them to 
execution of power will determine the outcome. The industrial stakeholders related to the 
FPA are generally much better organized than other stakeholders. Efforts to involve the civil 
society in both the EU and Mozambique through second order governance can give the 
discussions more voices advocating development. Of first order governance any involvement 
of Mozambican stakeholders in FPA operations contribu es to promoting fisheries sector 
development. This could involve employing Mozambican rew and encourage landings of 
catch and bycatch creating employment. The potential number of jobs that could be created 
should be identified, and Mozambique should develop strategies on how to increase the 
benefits from the FPA accruing the Mozambican stakeholders. 
  The GS needs to facilitate first and second order governance interactions in an 
efficient and effective manner. Distribution of responsibilities and execution of power need to 
be defined in a clear manner. Commitment at all levels of the system should be enforced and 
synergies within the system that can increase the ability to achieve the given objective should 
be explored. Projects and initiatives related to the development both within the EU and in 
Mozambique could be coupled with FPA projects. Workshops should be institutionalized and 
matrices showing all projects and links between them should be developed in order to identify 
such potential. First order interactions supporting he objective should be rewarded, while the 
lack of will to carry out such interactions could lead to limitations on access or higher fees.  
 The main governance forums, the Joint Committee and the Technical Committee 
should be more open in order to institutionalize a wider range of interests also directly into the 
governing interactions. Political governance should be clearly separated from the technical 
level in order to avoid speculations on the procedur s and motives behind decisions. It is also 
essential that all the involved representatives agree on the form of interactions, the 
responsibilities of those represented and what commit ents actually involve. While some 
consider the FPA purely as an access agreement that needs to be coherent with the EU’s 
development policy and not undermine the fisheries policy in Mozambique, others consider 
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the FPA as an instrument for development. The terms of the agreement should be made clear 
for everyone, in order for stakeholders to know what to expect and avoid disagreement.     
Further, interactions of first order governance need to be coherent with what is decided on. 
Actors should not apply power to carry out interactions outside their mandate, but it is also 
important that actors use the hammer when necessary. Mozambican authorities for instance 
need to withdraw licenses or fine vessels owners when regulations are not being withheld. 
The FPA funds need to be employed in a manner supporting fisheries sector development and 
should be coherent with long term strategies on howto achieve this.      
 
There seems to be political will to support the objective of promoting sustainable 
development of the fisheries sector in Mozambique, b t the challenge of implementing it 
remains. The internal conflict between the objectives of the FPA makes it challenging to 
coordinate interactions in a coherent manner, and the governance outcome will be a result of 
the dynamic between the objectives and the stakehold rs representing them. Boundaries for 
how interactions are carried out, how power is executed and what shall be expected from the 
parties are essential. Further commitment is needed at all levels. This should first and 
foremost be seen as voluntary, based on moral responsibilities and the need to legitimize 
actions. However, because the principle of economic profitability is so strong, it may be wise 
to introduce regulations which will give the stakeholders greater incentives to support the 
objective. Alternatively, enforcement mechanisms which can ensure commitment could be 
developed.   
7.2 Assessment of the research process   
The research process has been highly exploratory. While applying the interactive governance 
framework, the process of governing the FPA between th  EU and Mozambique has been 
described and assessed. The lack of information about this process prior to commencing the 
research made it difficult to predict how much and what kind of data could possibly be 
collected, and hence also the scope of the research project. Through the course of the project 
it became clear that the nature of the governance issue made it difficult to make detailed 
conclusions, and the aim of the project should rather be to describe the process while seeking 
to identify which components challenge the governing system’s ability to deliver one of the 
objects it commits to on paper.  
 Because of the complex nature of the research object and the mentioned lack of 
existing information the need for a well-structured search approach prevailed. The 
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interactive governance theory provided such a framework, and in addition the governability 
assessment made it possible to measure and compare how different components of the 
systems affected the governance outcome. Because of th comprehensive nature of the 
approach, time was needed in order to understand and apply it in a constructive manner. But 
when this was done, it provided me with a very well-structured and suitable instrument to 
study the comprehensive research object. It would have been much more difficult to know 
where to begin and what to look for, as well as ignore important components, without this 
framework.  
 The project can be criticized for having too high ambitions, because there is not 
enough data available for making thorough conclusions related to the levels of governability 
of each component. The response to this critic will be that in many cases detailed data does 
not exist, and this demonstrates one of the governability problems in itself. The governing 
system is required to handle uncertainty and construct interactions on the basis of theories 
about the system-to-be-governed. The scope of the thesis is in any case not to analyze one 
component in depth, but rather explore the whole process and identify where the most 
decisive components are found. In this way the research project will also take the form of an 
academic exercise, where the aim is to learn how to apply the conceptual framework on 
specific empirical case.   
  The wide research terrain made it challenging to navigate and easy to get lost, but also 
highly interesting to explore. The contemporary relevance of the subject made it especially 
interesting to follow new development, and the interdisciplinary character of the study gave 
me insight into a wide range issues related to global fisheries governance. From a personal 
point of view the experience with designing a research project, performing interviews and 
analyzing great quantities of data is invaluable.  
7.3 Future research needs 
This study has taken an exploratory form and has aimed to identify the most important 
components challenging governance performance. Eachcomponent or even each cell of the 
governability matrices shown in table 5 and 6 can be the basis for more detailed research. The 
need for more information about the natural system and connections within it seems most 
urgent in order to increase the existing level of knowledge about implications and potential of 
the FPA fisheries. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis of the FPA would be highly important, 
especially for Mozambique, in order to calculate th real values of the agreement.  
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The interactions suggested in section 6.2 to increase governability should be further explored 
and research projects investigating the interactions hypothetically could be useful to assess 
their relevance and potential.   
 As a consequence of the limited scope of this project, it is challenging to apply the 
findings of this research to generalize about the FPAs in general. The findings can, however, 
contribute to more comprehensive research projects and be applied to compare findings from 
other similar projects. Seen as the governance process and the level of governability related to 
it continuously changes, assessments are needed on a regular basis in order to follow its 
development. With the upcoming reform of the CFP in 2012, an assessment of its 
implications on the governance of the FPAs will be highly relevant after a certain period of 
time.  
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